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THE SCOPE OF IPR ESTOPPEL: A STATUTORY, HISTORICAL,
AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
Christa J. Laser*
Abstract
When Congress implemented inter partes review (IPR) and other
patent post-grant proceedings through the passage of the America Invents
Act (AIA) in 2011, it provided that petitioners would be estopped in later
proceedings from raising grounds for invalidity that they “raised or
reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 315(e)(2). However, substantial uncertainty in courts’ interpretation of
this provision causes an enormous impact on an accused patent
infringer’s decision of whether and on what grounds to petition for
review. One reading of the statutory estoppel provision suggests that
“during that inter partes review” refers to the time period after institution
of the IPR and before a final decision from the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board (PTAB). However, although the Federal Circuit has generally
favored a textualist reading of this statute, it has yet to address how the
estoppel standard would apply to grounds that the petitioner chose not to
include in the petition for IPR. Lower courts have taken widely divergent
approaches in this and various other factual scenarios where estoppel
might apply, with some courts assessing legislative history to determine
that Congress intended estoppel to apply broadly to any grounds that
could have been raised in the petition. These courts often engage in
complex assessments of what prior art the petitioner should have known
about and added to the petition, which adds unnecessary complexity and
cost to their determinations. This Article will explain that a narrow,
textualist reading of the IPR estoppel provision is consistent with
Supreme Court precedent on statutory interpretation and is justified in
light of the strict limits on IPR petitions adopted by the PTAB—limits
that Congress did not foresee and which effectively restrict the grounds
for invalidity that a petitioner may raise during the IPR. When the Federal
Circuit or the Supreme Court next has occasion to consider this issue, it
should hold that IPR estoppel applies narrowly only to grounds actually
raised and instituted.

* Christa J. Laser is an intellectual property litigation attorney in Washington, D.C. She
is registered to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. All opinions
expressed herein are that of the author alone and do not reflect those of her firm or its clients. The
author thanks the participants in the 2018 Works-In-Progress IP Conference and PatCon 8,
especially Dmitry Karshtedt, Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Sarah Rajec, Dan Brean, Mark Lemley, TunJen Chiang, Glynn Lunney, Dennis Crouch, and Michael Risch, for their helpful comments.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 16, 2011, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
(AIA)1 was signed into law with goals that included improving patent
quality and providing new, more efficient means to challenge the validity
of issued patents.2 Among other changes, the AIA granted the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) the authority to conduct
three new forms of adversarial challenges to an issued patent: inter partes
review (IPR), post-grant review (PGR), and covered business method
review (CBMR).3 The AIA further provided that, after the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board (PTAB) issues a final written decision as to the validity
of a patent claim in an IPR or PGR, the petitioner or the party bringing
the challenge, or its privy, is estopped from asserting in any later USPTO
proceeding, civil litigation, or Section 337 investigation before the
International Trade Commission (ITC) that the patent claim is invalid “on
any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised
during that inter partes review”; in the case of PGRs, the petitioner is
estopped from asserting claims of invalidity that it “raised or reasonably
could have raised during that post-grant review.”4 The precise scope of
this provision is hardly settled, but it has caused a significant
consideration for nearly every accused infringer in patent litigation since
the passage of the AIA: Do I risk being estopped from raising evidence
of invalidity if I choose to challenge this patent’s validity faster, and
potentially cheaper, at the PTAB?
One reading of the estoppel provisions, and the one advocated in this
Article, is that the phrase “during that . . . review” modifies “raised or
reasonably could have raised” and refers only to the pendency of the
review, that is, the time period after institution. Under this reading, a
petitioner is not estopped from raising grounds for invalidity in litigation
1. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
35 U.S.C.).
2. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39–40 (2011). See infra Part IV for a detailed discussion
of the impetus and goals for the AIA.
3. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39–40, 46–48, 54.
4. 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e)(2), 325(e)(2) (2012). Following CBMR, the same provision as
following PGR applies only in later USPTO proceedings, whereas in civil litigation or ITC
proceedings, the petitioner is estopped from raising “any ground that the petitioner raised during
that transitional [CBMR] proceeding.” AIA sec. 18(a)(1).
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when it declined to include those grounds in its petition for IPR or PGR.
This reading is consistent with the AIA’s statutory framework for postgrant proceedings, which clearly delineates the difference between the
pendency of the post-grant proceeding and the threshold inquiry into
whether to institute the review.5 This narrow reading is also the only
appropriate reading of the AIA’s estoppel provisions under the Supreme
Court’s modern, more textualist approach to statutory interpretation.6
The Federal Circuit has generally favored a textualist reading of this
statute, but it has yet to address how the estoppel standard would apply
to grounds that the petitioner chose not to include in the petition for IPR
or PGR. The Supreme Court likewise has not addressed this issue. Yet
many lower courts, after reviewing legislative history that indicates
Congress intended estoppel following IPRs to apply to any grounds that
reasonably could have been raised in the petition, have applied a broader
interpretation of estoppel than a textualist approach would support. In
addition to deviating from sound principles of statutory interpretation,
this broad approach is inconsistent with the historical limits on estoppel
and the AIA’s patent quality goals.
Section I of this Article provides an overview of the AIA’s post-grant
proceedings and associated estoppel provisions. Section II A describes
the Supreme Court’s shift in statutory interpretation toward textualism.
Applying this textualist approach, the remainder of Section II examines
the statutory context of the AIA’s estoppel provisions and the historical
meaning of key statutory terms in the common law to demonstrate that
statutory estoppel under the AIA should only apply to grounds for
invalidity that could be raised during the IPR or PGR (those grounds upon
which the PTAB instituted review).
Section III of this Article discusses how courts, including the Federal
Circuit, have interpreted the AIA’s estoppel provisions in prior cases. In
Section IV, this Article details the surprising legislative history of the
AIA’s estoppel provisions, which indicates that Congress intended
estoppel to apply narrowly following PGRs and more broadly only
following IPRs. This Article then concludes with a policy analysis in
Section V, which explains that a narrow reading of the AIA’s estoppel
provisions better supports the AIA’s patent quality goals, particularly in
light of the strict procedural limits on post-grant proceedings that render
the proceedings an incomplete alternative to district court litigation. To
accomplish Congress’s stated patent quality goals, poor quality patents
must be subject to thorough adversarial review. As this Article will
explain, these goals are undermined by broadening IPR estoppel so far

5. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
6. Infra Part II.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss6/1

4

Laser: The Scope of IPR Estoppel: A Statutory, Historical, and Normative

2018]

THE SCOPE OF IPR ESTOPPEL

1131

that grounds for invalidity not tested in post-grant review may
nonetheless be precluded from judicial review.
I. THE AIA’S POST-GRANT PROCEEDINGS AND ASSOCIATED
ESTOPPEL PROVISIONS
Among the AIA’s three new post-grant proceedings (IPR, PGR, and
CBMR), the most widely used and widely known is IPR. 7 IPR is an
adversarial proceeding concerning an issued patent that is conducted by
a panel of three administrative law judges on the PTAB.8 A petition for
IPR may challenge the patentability of any AIA patent issued at least nine
months prior to the petition—or any patent issued under pre-AIA
procedures, starting immediately after issuance—as either anticipated by
prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103.9 The
grounds for unpatentability must be based only on prior art consisting of
patents or printed publications.10
Whereas court cases proceed immediately upon the filing of the
complaint, a party challenging a patent at the PTAB must first submit a
petition requesting institution of the IPR.11 PTAB procedural rules
substantially limit the contents of this petition.12 In the initial years of
post-grant proceedings, PTAB rules limited petitions for IPR to sixty
pages of size fourteen font, including claim charts (which were required
to be presented in portrait orientation).13 After pushback from
stakeholders, the PTAB recently modified the page limitation to a word

7. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS 2
(2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/AIA%20Statistics_March2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TW3L-LPBJ] (noting that IPRs constituted 92% of the 6700 total AIA petitions
filed as of 2017, CBMRs constituted 7%, and PGRs constituted 1%).
8. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 6(c), 311(a).
9. Id. § 311. After passage of the AIA, a technical amendment permitted IPRs to be filed
on patents issued under the prior first-to-invent system immediately after issuance, rather than
nine months after issuance. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Technical Corrections, Pub. L. No.
112-274, § 1(d), 126 Stat. 2456, 2456 (2013). A petition for IPR may not be filed during the
pendency of a PGR. 35 U.S.C. § 311(c). IPRs also may not be filed if the petitioner previously
filed a civil action challenging validity or was sued for infringement of the patent more than one
year prior. Id. § 315(a)–(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.101 (2017).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).
11. See id. §§ 312, 314(c); St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Volcano Corp., 749 F.3d
1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The statute separates the Director’s decision to ‘institute’ the
review, § 314, on one hand, from the Board’s ‘conduct’ of the review ‘instituted’ by the Director,
§ 316(c) . . . .”).
12. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.24.
13. 37 C.F.R. § 42.24 (2015) (setting out page limitations); id. § 42.6(a)(2) (requiring size
fourteen font, as well as double spacing in the body of the petition); id. § 1.52(a)(1)(iii) (requiring
all Patent Office filings to be submitted in portrait orientation).
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count limitation effective May 2, 2016,14 but it remains restrictive. Under
current rules, petitions for IPR are limited to 14,000 words including
claim charts.15 Because petitioners are frequently unable to include and
adequately explain all possible grounds for unpatentability in a petition
of only 14,000 words, these procedures effectively limit the number of
grounds a petitioner may include in the petition for review. This differs
from court proceedings, where parties may include all possible grounds
for invalidity in their pleadings, subject only to the limits of Rule 11.16
After the petitioner files its petition for review, the patent owner may
file a preliminary response to the petition setting out the reasons why
review should not be instituted.17 Within three months of that response,
the PTAB will issue a determination of whether to institute review.18 The
determination to institute is based on a threshold finding of whether the
petition for review “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the
petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 [one] of the claims
challenged in the petition.”19 The AIA also permits the PTAB to deny a
petition if it presents “the same or substantially the same prior art or
arguments” as previously before the Office.20 The PTAB’s decision of
whether to institute review is final and non-appealable.21
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu22
in 2018, the Patent Office typically granted partial institutions, instituting
review only as to those grounds in the petition that the PTAB believed
were likely to succeed.23 The PTAB also sometimes declined to institute
14. Amendments to the Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board, 81 Fed. Reg. 18,750, 18,750 (Apr. 1, 2016).
15. 37 C.F.R. § 42.24 (2017).
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 313 (2012). This response must be filed within three months. 37 C.F.R.
§ 42.107. To expedite proceedings, a patent owner may file an election to waive the preliminary
response. Id. The petitioner may seek leave to reply to a preliminary response on a showing of
good cause. Id. § 42.108(c).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b).
19. Id. § 314(a).
20. Id. § 325(d) (“In determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this
chapter [PGR and CBMR], chapter 30 [reexamination], or chapter 31 [IPR], the Director may
take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the
same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.”). This authority is separate
from and in addition to the estoppel effect of prior decisions. See id. §§ 315(e), 325(e).
21. Id. § 314(d).
22. 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
23. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (2016) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board may
authorize the review to proceed on all or some of the challenged claims and on all or some of the
grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. . . . Inter partes review shall not be instituted
for a ground of unpatentability unless the Board decides that the petition supporting the ground
would demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the claims challenged
in the petition is unpatentable.”), invalidated in part by SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
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review on grounds that it considered “redundant” with other grounds
upon which it did institute review, either because of substantive overlap
or other (often unstated) justifications.24 However, following the
Supreme Court’s SAS Institute decision, the PTAB may no longer grant
partial institutions; if the PTAB finds that there is a reasonable likelihood
that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims
challenged in the petition, the PTAB must institute review as to all
grounds and all challenged claims.25
The PTAB’s written institution decision sets out the grounds being
instituted and a date “on which the review shall commence.”26 The parties
to an IPR may participate in limited discovery that includes depositions
of declarants, such as expert witnesses, and any discovery the parties
agree to between themselves, with additional discovery only available
upon a motion demonstrating that it is “in the interests of justice.”27
Evidence presented must comport with the Federal Rules of Evidence,
and parties may file motions to exclude, or for protective orders, in
accordance with these rules.28 Before the PTAB issues its final written
decision, the parties are entitled to an oral hearing.29 Unlike courts, which
will only find a patent invalid based on “clear and convincing
evidence,”30 the PTAB may find claims unpatentable after issuance if a
“preponderance of the evidence” demonstrates their unpatentability.31
The pendency of review from institution to final decision will generally
be no more than one year.32 Either party may appeal an adverse final
decision directly to the Federal Circuit.33
The AIA provides for statutory estoppel following the PTAB’s final
written decision in an IPR.34 Specifically, the petitioner to an IPR of a
24. See Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1299 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (discussing the PTAB’s redundancy rules and noting that the Federal Circuit lacks
jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision to decline review on redundancy grounds), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 374 (2016). Some judges raised the concern that the PTAB’s frequent failure
to “provide a reasoned basis how or why grounds are ‘redundant’” violated the Administrative
Procedures Act and was problematic under a broad reading of the estoppel provision. Id. at 1302–
05 (Reyna, J., concurring).
25. SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1354–60.
26. 35 U.S.C. § 314(c).
27. Id. § 316(a)(5); 37 C.F.R. § 42.51.
28. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.54, 42.62, 42.64.
29. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(10).
30. Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011) (“§ 282 requires an invalidity
defense to be proved by clear and convincing evidence.”).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e).
32. Id. § 316(a)(11). This may be extended up to six months on a showing of good cause.
Id.
33. Id. §§ 141(c), 319; see also id. § 329 (providing appeal to the Federal Circuit following
PGR and CBMR).
34. Id. § 315(e).
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patent claim addressed in a final written decision is barred from later
raising any ground for invalidity at the USPTO or in courts or the ITC
“that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that
inter partes review”:
(e) Estoppel.—
(1) Proceedings before the office.—The petitioner in an inter
partes review of a claim in a patent under this chapter that
results in a final written decision under section 318(a), or the
real party in interest or privy of the petitioner, may not
request or maintain a proceeding before the Office with
respect to that claim on any ground that the petitioner raised
or reasonably could have raised during that inter partes
review.
(2) Civil actions and other proceedings.—The petitioner in
an inter partes review of a claim in a patent under this chapter
that results in a final written decision under section 318(a),
or the real party in interest or privy of the petitioner, may not
assert either in a civil action arising in whole or in part under
section 1338 of title 28 or in a proceeding before the
International Trade Commission under section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 that the claim is invalid on any ground
that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised
during that inter partes review.35
The AIA also created PGR proceedings. A petition for PGR may
challenge patentability on any ground that may serve as an invalidity
defense under § 282, including obviousness, novelty, indefiniteness, and
patentable subject matter, with no limitations on the type of prior art that
may be raised.36 A PGR must be filed within nine months of patent
issuance.37 Like IPRs, PGRs are conducted before a panel of
administrative law judges on the PTAB and include the right to limited
discovery and a hearing.38 Also like IPRs, petitions for PGR are subject
to procedural limitations, including a maximum word count, though the
word count is higher than that applicable to petitions for IPR.39
The estoppel provision applicable to PGR is substantially identical to
that applicable in IPR:
(e) Estoppel.—
(1) Proceedings before the office.—The petitioner in a post35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. § 321(b).
Id. § 321(c).
Id. § 326(a), (c).
37 C.F.R. § 42.24 (2017) (18,700 words vs. 14,000 words).
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grant review of a claim in a patent under this chapter that
results in a final written decision under section 328(a), or the
real party in interest or privy of the petitioner, may not
request or maintain a proceeding before the Office with
respect to that claim on any ground that the petitioner raised
or reasonably could have raised during that post-grant
review.
(2) Civil actions and other proceedings.—The petitioner in a
post-grant review of a claim in a patent under this chapter
that results in a final written decision under section 328(a),
or the real party in interest or privy of the petitioner, may not
assert either in a civil action arising in whole or in part under
section 1338 of title 28 or in a proceeding before the
International Trade Commission under section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 that the claim is invalid on any ground
that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised
during that post-grant review.40
The third new post-grant proceeding, CBMR, is a transitional
proceeding—available until September 15, 2020—that is reserved for
challenges to the validity of “covered business method” patents, which
are defined in the statute as patents that claim “performing data
processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or
management of a financial product or service,” except “technological
inventions.”41 The petitioner may petition for CBMR any time after
patent issuance.42 CBMR otherwise generally incorporates the standards
and procedures applicable to PGR, with the exception of the portion of
PGR’s estoppel provision applicable in courts and the ITC.43 Estoppel
following CBMR is available in these fora on grounds “raised during that
transitional proceeding”:
The petitioner in a transitional proceeding that results in a
final written decision under section 328(a) of title 35, United
States Code, with respect to a claim in a covered business
method patent, or the petitioner’s real party in interest, may
not assert, either in a civil action arising in whole or in part
40. 35 U.S.C. § 325(e).
41. AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 18(d)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 331 (2011) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.); 37 C.F.R. 42.300(d).
42. AIA sec. 18(a)(1)(A) (“The transitional proceeding implemented pursuant to this
subsection shall be regarded as, and shall employ the standards and procedures of, a post-grant
review under chapter 32 of title 35, United States Code, subject to the following: (A) Section
321(c) of title 35, United States Code, and subsections (b), (e)(2), and (f) of section 325 of such
title shall not apply to a transitional proceeding.”).
43. Id.
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under section 1338 of title 28, United States Code, or in a
proceeding before the International Trade Commission
under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. [§]
1337), that the claim is invalid on any ground that the
petitioner raised during that transitional proceeding.44
II. APPLYING THE SUPREME COURT’S MODERN, TEXTUALIST APPROACH
TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. The Supreme Court’s Textualist Turn
Prior to the 20th century, American law typically followed a rule of
“no recourse” in statutory interpretation; a text’s meaning was derived
from its words and without resort to legislative history.45 Yet, in a period
lasting at least half of the 20th century and peaking in the 1970s and
1980s, the Supreme Court began to find importance in legislative intent.
During that period, the Court resorted more frequently to legislative
history and other sources external to statutory text, both to resolve
ambiguities in the text and even to reinterpret clear text according to
apparent legislative intent or purpose.46 That period is waning;
particularly over the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has shifted
again to an increasingly textualist approach to statutory interpretation, in
part due to the late Justice Scalia’s influence on the Court.47 These
44. Id. sec. 18(a)(1)(D).
45. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897) (“[D]ebates
in Congress are not appropriate sources of information from which to discover the meaning of the
language of a statute passed by that body.”); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 332 (1827)
(“[W]ords are to be understood in that sense in which they are generally used by those for whom
the instrument was intended . . . .”); ALEXANDER HAMILTON, OPINION ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A BANK (1791), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
63, 111 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965) (“[W]hatever may have been the intention of the framers of
a constitution, or of a law, that intention is to be sought for in the instrument itself . . . .”);
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
369–72 (2012) (collecting citations on historical American statutory interpretation) (“The law as
it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken
is in the act itself.” (quoting Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 15 (1845))).
46. Train v. Colo. Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976); SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 45, at 373–74 (collecting research noting a peak in the citation of legislative
history in the 1970s and a return to lower rates of citation in the early 2000s); Jorge L. Carro &
Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical
Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 303 (1982); John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism,
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1291 (2010) (citing, e.g., United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S.
534, 542 (1940)); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 197–99 (1983).
47. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 374; James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The
Decline and Fall of Legislative History? Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and
Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 222 (2006); Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change,
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shifting sands are possible because principles of statutory interpretation
stated in any decision are typically dicta when applied to later cases
involving different statutes; the principle of stare decisis does not bind
the Court to continue to follow, in different types of cases, the same
methods of statutory interpretation that were popular a generation prior.48
Under the Supreme Court’s modern, textualist approach, “the
authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or
any other extrinsic material.”49 These modern cases espouse that “when
the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least
where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it
according to its terms.”50
1. Constitutional Demands
Although the Supreme Court’s preference for textualism has changed
over time, unchanging constitutional principles support its most recent
renewal. To comply with constitutional demands for bicameralism and
presentment, Congress must express the law through statutory text that
both Houses vote upon and present to the President for signature before
enactment, not through statements made on the floor of Congress or in
committee reports but left out of the text, which other legislators or the
President might not agree to and certainty do not vote upon.51 Moreover,
38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1971, 1981 (2005) (“The Court relies less on legislative history today than
it did before Justice Scalia arrived, and it cites dictionaries more frequently. Moreover, no good
advocate before the Court today would focus an argument almost exclusively on the legislative
history (as many good advocates did a generation ago).” (footnotes omitted)); Manning, supra
note 46, at 1312–13 (noting “the Court’s growing tendency . . . simply to stick closely to the text
of a statute when its semantic import is clear”).
48. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 87, 412; see also Frickey, supra note 47, at
1974–81 (discussing the Supreme Court’s history of purposivism in interpretation of civil rights
statutes and concluding that textualism is less likely to take hold in this area due to stare decisis).
49. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005).
50. Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. v.
Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)). Courts do not find absurdity lightly. Allapattah
Servs., 545 U.S. at 565 (noting that what “may seem odd . . . is not absurd”); accord SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 45, at 237 (“The absurdity must consist of a disposition that no reasonable
person could intend.”).
51. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of
the United States . . . .”); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191–92 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“Committee reports, floor speeches, and even colloquies between
Congressmen, . . . are frail substitutes for bicameral vote upon the text of a law and its
presentment to the President.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory
Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 82 (2017) (“Intents are irrelevant even if discernable (which
they aren’t), because our Constitution provides for the enactment and approval of texts, not of
intents.”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Talking Textualism, Practicing Pragmatism: Rethinking the
Supreme Court's Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 51 GA. L. REV. 121, 160 (2016).
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a method of interpretation that looks to legislative history—like
committee reports—to determine the law impermissibly delegates
legislative powers to committee staff and the other narrow few who make
that legislative history, which contravenes the Constitutional requirement
that the legislative power is “vested in a Congress”—not its staff
members or a minority of its members.52 A textualist approach also
appropriately limits the power of courts to make policy decisions ex
nihilo, which should be left to elected legislators on issues where they
have acted through statute, both to ensure that voters have accountable
representation of their policy interests and to prevent harmful
politicization of the judiciary.53
2. Transparency and Rule of Law
Where policy justifications for a particular holding are strong, or
where the legislature clearly intended a result opposite to that arising
from the clear meaning of the text, it can be tempting to make exceptions
to the textualist approach in the interests of justice in that particular case.
This is a mistake.54 As the Supreme Court has stated, “in the long run,
experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements
specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded
administration of the law.”55 In addition to conforming to the
constitutional principles described above, a textualist approach provides
more certainty to parties and the legislature with regard to how the laws

52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.”);
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 87 (Richard H. Cox ed., Harlan Davidson 1982)
(1689) (stating that legislative power is the power to “make laws, . . . not to make legislators”);
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 386 (“[L]egislative power, like judicial power, is
nondelegable.”); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
673, 728 (1997); see also Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Tr. Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280
(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“No one would think that
the House of Representatives could operate in such fashion that only the broad outlines of bills
would be adopted by vote of the full House, leaving minor details to be written, adopted, and
voted upon only by the cognizant committees. Thus, if legislation consists of forming an ‘intent’
rather than adopting a text (a proposition with which I do not agree), Congress cannot leave the
formation of that intent to a small band of its number, but must, as the Constitution says, form an
intent of the Congress.”).
53. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at xxiii, xxvii.
54. Id. at 348 (“If judges think no further ahead than achieving justice in the dispute now at
hand, the law becomes subject to personal preferences and hence shrouded in doubt.”).
55. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra
note 45, at 345 (“The nearer a government approaches towards a republic, the more the manner
of judging becomes settled and fixed.” (quoting MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 93
(Thomas Nugent trans., Batoche Books 2001) (1748))).
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will be interpreted than do intentionalist or purposivist approaches.56 A
textualist approach ensures that legislators can accurately legislate
according to the needs of their constituents without fear of judicial
usurpation of that role and that judges have a firm methodology for
consistent application of the law from case to case. Indeed, the textualist
approach encourages legislators to craft statutes carefully so as to reduce
interpretations contrary to legislative intent.57 If an outcome is not what
Congress intended, and if it is significant enough, Congress will change
the statute.58
B. Plain Reading in Context
Under the modern approach, an interpretation of the AIA’s statutory
estoppel provisions must start with the statutory language, read according
to the plain meaning of its terms.59 The plain meaning is the meaning that
reasonable people at the time the text was written would ordinarily
ascribe to the term, in the context in which it was written.60 Courts using
this approach will not construe the words in isolation, but will instead
construe terms in light of the statute as a whole, considering, for example,
how the same words are used elsewhere in the statute and whether a
particular interpretation would irreconcilably clash with other provisions

56. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 348 (“[A]lthough properly informed human
minds may agree on what a text means, human hearts often disagree on what is right.”).
Intentionalism and purposivism are approaches to statutory interpretation that consider
legislators’ intended meaning and the apparent purpose of the statute.
57. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at xxviii n.2; Daniel A. Farber, Statutory
Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 298 (1989); Frickey, supra note 47,
at 1981 (“If the regime’s jurisprudence is transparent to the legislature, legislative staff should be
able to draft statutes so that legislators can carry out their related business.”).
58. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 344 (“Perhaps the most efficacious mode of
procuring good laws, certainly the only one allowable to a Court of Justice, is to act fully up to
the spirit and language of bad ones, and to let their inconvenience be fully felt by giving them full
effect.” (quoting Pocock v. Pickering [1852] 18 QB 789 at 798 (Eng.))).
59. Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652, 1658 (2017) (looking first
to statutory text to interpret an ERISA exception and noting that the Court’s interpretation will
“[s]tart . . . with the statutory language”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 56.
60. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 16 (“In their full context, words mean what they
conveyed to reasonable people at the time they were written—with the understanding that general
terms may embrace later technological innovations.”); see also id. at 69 (“Words are to be
understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings—unless the context indicates that they bear a
technical sense.”).
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in the statute.61 Identical terms used in different parts of a statute are
presumed to have the same meaning.62
A central issue in interpretation of the AIA’s estoppel provisions is
whether the phrase “during that . . . review” or “during that transitional
proceeding,” which modifies each of the estoppel provisions,63 means
during the pendency of the review by the PTAB (the time period after
institution of review and before final decision) or whether this time period
begins with the petition for review. If the “review” begins only after
institution, then grounds not raised in the petition or grounds denied
institution will not be subject to estoppel because they were not raised
“during that . . . review.” However, if the “review” begins with the
petition, then estoppel will apply to any grounds that the petitioner raised
or could have raised in its petition for review. The AIA’s statutory
framework for post-grant proceedings provides the critical context to
answer this interpretive question.
The AIA’s statutory framework for post-grant proceedings clearly
delineates between the pendency of the review versus the threshold
inquiry into whether to institute the review.64 For example, the statute’s
discussion of the form of the notice of institution of review states that the
“notice shall include the date on which the review shall commence.”65 If
a “review” does not commence until after institution in this section of the
statute, the phrase “during that . . . review” in the estoppel provisions
should be read similarly as referring to the time period starting after
institution. Elsewhere, the statute separates the institution decision from
the PTAB’s “conduct” of the “review.”66 When read plainly within this
statutory context, the qualifying phrase “during that . . . review” or
61. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005) (“[T]he normal rule of statutory
interpretation [is] that identical words used in different parts of the same statute are generally
presumed to have the same meaning.”); Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809
(1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be
read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”); SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 45, at 167–69 (citing K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988);
United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988));
see also Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980) (declining to adopt different
definitions of term in different statutory provisions).
62. Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 34.
63. 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e)(2), 325(e)(2) (2012); AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 18(a)(1), 125
Stat. 284, 330 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
64. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
65. Id. § 314(c).
66. St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Volcano Corp., 749 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (“The statute separates the Director’s decision to ‘institute’ the review, § 314, on one hand,
from the Board’s ‘conduct’ of the review ‘instituted’ by the Director, § 316(c) . . . .”). Note that
the Director delegated the institution decision to the PTAB by regulation, but the processes remain
separate. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (2017).
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“during that transitional proceeding” clearly serves to limit the triggering
events for estoppel to the time period occurring during the pendency of
the review before the PTAB—the time period after institution and before
the PTAB’s final decision.
Some might argue that this narrow reading results in an unusual
reading of the word “raised,” because the petitioner’s only opportunity to
“raise” or bring up grounds that can be considered during the review is in
the petition—there is no opportunity, after institution, to bring up
additional grounds. However, if the estoppel provision is read broadly in
order to accommodate a reading of the word “raised” to mean “first
raised,” then either the word “during” would have an even more unusual
reading that includes “not during,” or the phrase “inter partes review”
would carry a different meaning than the remainder of the statute
provides. “Raised,” within the context of this provision, could
alternatively mean “caused to be considered,” such as when the petitioner
presents its arguments at the hearing before the PTAB.67 Because
“during” and “inter partes review” can have no other broader meaning,
but “raised” could ordinarily refer to issues presented to the PTAB for
consideration at any time, any apparent conflict between these meanings
should be resolved in favor of conserving the ordinary meaning of the
term “during” and the statutory meaning of the term “inter partes
review.”
C. Expressio Unius
Under the Negative Implication Canon, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, the specification of one is the exclusion of another.68 In
particular, where a statute provides specific circumstances under which a
rule, such as estoppel, shall apply, this canon suggests that the rule does
not apply outside those enumerated circumstances unless the statute
otherwise indicates that those specifics are not exclusive.69 Applying this
canon to the AIA’s estoppel provisions, the extension of estoppel to “any
ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during
that inter partes review” (emphasis added) necessarily precludes from
67. See Raise, ENG. OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, en.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/raise [https://perma.cc/3P4U-63K8] (“Cause to occur or be considered.”).
68. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 107; see also Hartford Underwriters Ins. v. Union
Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (finding that a statute specifying that trustees could obtain
certain relief under a provision of a statute precluded others from obtaining relief under that
provision).
69. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 514 (1974) (finding that a statute establishing
that certain procedures could be authorized by the Attorney General or Assistant Attorney General
excluded others from authorizing those procedures, by negative implication); SCALIA & GARNER,
supra note 45, at 107.
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this statutory estoppel any circumstances falling outside this specific
temporal limitation, such as grounds not raised in the petition for review.
Some might argue that application of this canon would exclude from
estoppel triggering events that Congress clearly intended to cover.
However, because statutory provisions are read by interpreting the
ordinary meaning of words and not the contents of legislators’ minds, a
construction should not change merely because it fails to cover matter or
reach a scope that the legislature might have intended the provision to
cover.70 Moreover, as discussed in more detail below, it is often difficult
to determine what exactly the legislature intended a provision to do, if the
legislature were to have a single cohesive “intent” at all.
D. Obvious Alternative Canon
An argument that Congress intended a provision to be read differently
than according to the plain meaning of the text is particularly
unpersuasive where “obvious alternative” language is available to convey
the alternate reading but was not used.71 Admittedly, this canon has
significant risk of hindsight bias; most alternatives proposed post facto
likely never passed through legislators’ minds during drafting.
Nonetheless, this risk is mitigated because the canon is typically only
applied to further buttress a plain meaning analysis of the statute, the
constitutional merits of which are explained above, rather than to supply
a new interpretation.72
“Obvious alternative” language for the AIA’s estoppel provisions is
available to convey a broad reading that applies to all grounds that could
70. Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992) (“The question . . . is not what
Congress ‘would have wanted’ but what Congress enacted . . . .”); Comm’r v. Asphalt Prods. Co.,
482 U.S. 117, 119 (1987) (per curiam) (reading a statute requiring that “[i]f any part of any
underpayment [of a tax] . . . is due to negligence . . . there shall be added to the tax an amount
equal to 5 percent of the underpayment” should not be read to limit the penalty to the portion of
the underpayment that was due to negligence); Ebert v. Poston, 266 U.S. 548, 554 (1925) (“A
casus omissus does not justify judicial legislation.”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 93
(“[A] matter not covered is to be treated as not covered.”).
71. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1227 (2014) (when legislators did not
adopt “obvious alternative” language, “the natural implication is that they did not intend” the
alternative); accord SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018) (“[I]f Congress wanted
to adopt the Director’s approach it knew exactly how to do so.”); Advocate Health Care Network
v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652, 1659 (2017) (“Had Congress wanted, as the employees contend, to
alter only the maintenance requirement, it had an easy way to do so—differing by only two words
from the language it chose, but with an altogether different meaning.”).
72. See generally Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (applying the obvious alternative canon in this
way); Manning, supra note 52, at 728 (1997) (“If something appears in the legislative history . . .
then someone in the enactment process necessarily anticipated the point . . . . The sole impediment
is the burden of enacting the already-identified legal principle into law through bicameralism and
presentment—a burden that the Constitution expressly contemplates and requires.”).
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have been raised in the petition for IPR, as intentionalists argue the statute
should be read. Simply, Congress could have provided that estoppel
extends to “any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have
raised in the petition for inter partes review.” The modified provision
would thus read:
The petitioner in an inter partes review of a claim in a
patent under this chapter that results in a final written
decision under section 318(a), or the real party in interest or
privy of the petitioner, may not assert either in a civil action
arising in whole or in part under section 1338 of title 28 or
in a proceeding before the International Trade Commission
under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 that the claim is
invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably
could have raised during that inter partes review in the
petition for inter partes review.73
This “obvious alternative” language further supports the narrow plain
reading of the statutory text.
E. Surplusage Canon or Avoidance of Nullity
The “surplusage canon” provides that courts should “give effect, if
possible, to every clause and word of a statute” and “presum[e] that each
word Congress uses is there for a reason.”74 However, the “preference for
avoiding surplusage constructions is not absolute.”75 In a conflict
between a plain reading that renders a word or phrase a surplusage and a
reading that avoids surplusage but creates ambiguity within the text, the
Supreme Court has stated that courts “should prefer the plain meaning.”76
Application of this canon to the AIA’s estoppel provisions arguably
yields competing nullities, though only one reading both limits a nullity
and remains consistent with plain meaning.
1. “during that . . . review”
A reading of the AIA’s estoppel provision whereby events occurring
prior to institution trigger estoppel renders the statutory phrase “during
that inter partes review” or “during that post-grant review” a nullity.
73. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (2012).
74. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. at 1659 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000))
(rejecting reading of ERISA exception that required viewing a phrase as “stray marks on a page”);
accord Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 208 n.53 (1985) (“[W]e must give effect to every word that
Congress used in the statute.”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 174–79 (“These words
cannot be meaningless, else they would not have been used.” (quoting United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936))).
75. Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004).
76. Id.; accord SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 176 (“[A] court may well prefer
ordinary meaning to an unusual meaning that will avoid surplusage.”).
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What purpose does this phrase serve if not to place a temporal limitation
on the triggering events for estoppel to only grounds raised during the
pendency of the review? Indeed, the only way a broad reading would not
render this phrase a nullity is if the meaning of the phrase “inter partes
review” or “post-grant review” is broadly defined to include not only the
pendency of the review, but also the time period of the petition for review
and deliberation on whether to institute review. However, as explained
above, such a broad definition would conflict with the context of the
statute—which delineates between these two time periods—and the
meaning of the term “review” as used throughout the statute.77 Because a
broad reading would render the phrase “during that inter partes review”
a nullity, the surplusage canon cautions against such a reading.
2. “reasonably could have raised”
In an alternative application of this canon, some might argue that a
narrow reading of the estoppel statute renders the phrase “or reasonably
could have raised” a nullity. However, this is not necessarily true.78 One
circumstance under which a petitioner “reasonably could have raised” art
during the review, but did not, is if a prior art combination is a subset of
instituted grounds. For example, if the petitioner argues that a claim is
obvious over the combination of three references (A, B, and C), the
petitioner reasonably could have raised obviousness over a subset (A and
B) during the course of the review. The “or reasonably could have raised”
language would permit a court to apply estoppel to later arguments that
the patent was obvious over the subset. At least one court applying a
textualist approach to IPR estoppel adopted this understanding to find that
estoppel applies to subsets of instituted grounds.79 More broadly, a
petitioner might simply choose, for strategic reasons or because of
limitations on space or time, to focus on certain grounds for
unpatentability during the course of the review despite having included
more grounds in its petition for review, such as if the institution decision
provides insight on which grounds are most likely to succeed before the
Board. Grounds that the petitioner includes in its petition but chooses not
to address at the hearing or otherwise during the pendency of the review
77. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 314(c).
78. Also note that in some statutes, two phrases separated by the word “or” may be
considered synonyms rather than the second item being read as surplusage, such as in “exemplary
or punitive damages.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 122.
79. Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc, No. 12-CV-05501-SI, 2017 WL
235048, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017) (“The Court finds that defendants raised, or could have
raised, these grounds in the IPR proceedings, as the combination of Dhallan and Binladen is
simply a subset of the instituted grounds.”). Note that under this approach, estoppel would not
extend to combinations of instituted “prior art as combined with art not presented,” such as a
combination of A and D. Id. at *4 n.4.
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are grounds that it “reasonably could have raised during that inter partes
review.”
Those who favor a broad approach might argue that the difference in
language between the estoppel provisions for IPR and PGR, which refer
to grounds the petitioner “raised or reasonably could have raised,” and
the provision for CBMR, which only refers to grounds “raised,” confirms
that the “reasonably could have raised” language is not surplusage and
that there is a difference in meaning. However, even if there is a
difference in meaning, a unique meaning of the phrase “reasonably could
have raised” does not alter the temporally limiting phrase “during
that . . . review” or “during that transitional proceeding” that immediately
follows it and qualifies it in each of the estoppel provisions. Regardless
of the meaning of “reasonably could have raised,” the “during . . .” phrase
continues to restrict the triggering events for estoppel to those arising
post-institution. A unique case might arise where the distinction between
“raised . . . during . . . that review” and “reasonably could have raised
during . . . that review” is relevant, such as if a court were trying to
determine whether a petitioner is estopped from raising subsets of
instituted grounds following CBMR. Nevertheless, because the
distinction does not modify the temporal qualifier, it is not relevant to the
determination of meaning at issue here: Whether a petitioner is estopped
from raising in later proceedings a ground not raised in the petition for
review.
Ultimately, a reading under which “reasonably could have raised”
refers to grounds raised at a time other than during the pendency of review
places this phrase in conflict with its immediate modifying phrase,
“during that inter partes review.” Because reading this provision broadly
to avoid “reasonably could have raised” becoming surplusage creates
rather than resolves ambiguity, whereas a narrow reading that avoids
“during that . . . review” becoming surplusage comports with plain
meaning, courts should prefer the plain, narrow reading.80 Alternatively,
perhaps this is a conflict resulting from imperfect draftsmanship, where
a nullity is created under any reading of the statute. If so, the two
competing nullities must be reconciled. However, only one reading both
limits a nullity and remains consistent with the other canons of statutory
construction described above and below: a narrow reading.
F. Imputed Common Law
Under the canon of imputed common law meaning, a common law
term in a statute ordinarily carries its common law meaning, elements,

80. See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 536.
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and limitations.81 Although there are several types of preclusion in the
common law, the AIA’s statutory estoppel provisions refer to “estoppel”
and “estopped.”82 These are terms that, as explained below, convey a
unique meaning from the other forms of preclusion available under the
common law.83 Imputing the common law of estoppel into the AIA’s
estoppel provision results in a narrow reach that does not extend to
grounds that were not both fully and fairly litigated between the parties
and decided in a judicial manner by the PTAB. Additionally, it yields a

81. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1999 (2016) (“[I]t is a
settled principle of interpretation that, absent other indication, Congress intends to incorporate the
well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses.” (quoting Sekhar v. United States, 570
U.S. 729, 732 (2013))); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23 (1999) (imputing a requirement of
materiality from the common law test for fraud to a statute using an undefined term “defraud”);
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259–60 (1992) (“[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in
which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably
knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of
learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless
otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with
widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.” (quoting Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952))); Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992) (“[W]here
Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a court
must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the
established meaning of these terms.” (quoting Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 739–40 (1989))); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at 320 (“A statute that uses a commonlaw term, without defining it, adopts its common-law meaning.”); see also Microsoft Corp. v. I4I
Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 102 (2011) (“Under the general rule that a common-law term comes
with its common-law meaning, we cannot conclude that Congress intended to ‘drop’ the
heightened standard of proof from the presumption simply because § 282 fails to reiterate it
expressly.”); Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650, 655 (1962) (“For in the absence of anything
to the contrary it is fair to assume that Congress used that word in the statute in its common-law
sense.”); McCool v. Smith, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 459, 469 (1861) (“[W]henever our Legislature
use[s] a term without defining it . . . they must be supposed to use it in the sense in which it is
understood in the English law.” (quoting Hillhouse v. Chester, 3 Day 166, 211–12 (Conn. 1808))).
This cannon is distinct from the cannon against interpretation in derogation of the common law,
see United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993), which some might argue is not a textualist
cannon. In contrast, interpreting an undefined statutory term that has an established meaning at
common law according to the common law meaning is a textualist form of statutory interpretation,
like using dictionaries from the time of enactment to define an undefined term.
82. E.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e), 325(e).
83. Some might argue that the common law meaning should not be imputed here because
the statute provides for the conditions under which estoppel will apply, overriding the common
law meaning. But in choosing between a broad or narrow scope reading of the provision, the
common law meaning of the terms used should be considered. Moreover, as the Supreme Court
has applied this canon in the past, the common law meaning of terms used in statute will apply
absent an indication in the text to derogate from it; the mere failure to mention factors or
considerations imputed from that common law is not considered a contrary indication. E.g., Evans
v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 259–60 (1992); Nader v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23 (1999).
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surprising new argument to curb untoward practices (such as panel
stacking) at the PTAB.
1. Estoppel’s Distinct Origin in Common Law
Over the course of a millennium, two primary types of common law
preclusion based on prior adjudication arose from two distinct legal roots
and with two distinct standards and purposes: res judicata, also called
claim preclusion, and estoppel, also called issue preclusion.84 Res
judicata (or claim preclusion) derives from the Roman principle of the
same name.85 Its historical purpose was to provide repose to parties from
the threat of litigation of successive claims by the same party arising from
the same circumstances.86 When it was incorporated into English law by
the early 1100s, the principle retained this rationale of protection of
private persons from “re-agitation.”87
Res judicata or claim preclusion comprises the two related doctrines
of merger and bar.88 Under the doctrine of merger, when a final judgment
84. See 18 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 131.11 (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2017) (citing
Developments in the Law—Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 820–21 (1952)) (“The doctrine
of claim preclusion has its origins in Roman civil law, but has been part of English common law
for almost nine centuries.”); Alexandra Bursak, Preclusions, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1651, 1660–69
(2016) (describing the separate histories of res judicata, which arose from Roman law, and
collateral estoppel, derived from Anglo-Norman law). Note that courts sometimes imprecisely
apply the term “res judicata” in a broader sense. Weaver Corp. v. Kidde, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 61, 63
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“One difficulty is that courts use ‘res judicata’ for two different concepts. Some
use it to mean claim preclusion. Others employ res judicata in a general sense, to encompass both
claim and issue preclusion.”); see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (applying the
term res judicata to both claim and issue preclusion). This Article will use these terms consistently
with their historical roots by referring to res judicata only for claim preclusion, not as
encompassing both claim and issue preclusion. In addition to the types of preclusion arising from
judgments, as discussed herein, other types of preclusion may arise. These include, for example,
estoppel in pais, under which “a person who makes a representation may be estopped to deny its
truth if the person to whom it was made has changed his position in reliance.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27, cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1982). Given that the context of the AIA’s
estoppel provisions refers to estoppel following a final written decision of the PTAB, the type of
estoppel applicable to this provision will be the form of estoppel based on prior decision, not
estoppel in pais.
85. Bursak, supra note 84, at 1661 (describing the historical application of res judicata in
Roman law).
86. Id. at 1661–63 (describing policy justifications expressed in Roman texts, noting, “[t]he
policy rationale offered in Roman treatises . . . reflects the private nature of res judicata”).
87. Id. at 1663 (quoting GEORGE SPENCER BOWER & SIR ALEXANDER KINGCOME TURNER,
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA 412 (2d ed. 1969)); Robert Wyness Millar, The Historical
Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata, 35 ILL. L. REV. 41, 44 (1940) (“[B]y the opening
years of the 1100s, at latest, the Roman principle of res judicata had entered into the law of
England.”).
88. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984) (“Claim
preclusion therefore encompasses the law of merger and bar.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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is entered in favor of a plaintiff, Plaintiff’s claim and any of Defendant’s
defenses to that claim are extinguished and merged into the judgment.89
Likewise, under the doctrine of bar, a final judgment rendered on the
merits in favor of the defendant will serve as a bar to another action by
the plaintiff encompassing the same claim.90 The scope of the “claim”
that is merged or barred extends not only to the precise causes of action
and defenses asserted, but to any claims, causes of action, or defenses that
arise from the same transaction or series of transactions.91
Estoppel, also called issue preclusion or direct and collateral estoppel,
arose from Anglo-Norman principles of law; the name estoppel is derived
from the French estoupe, meaning a stop or conclusion.92 Unlike the
private justifications of res judicata, Anglo-Norman estoppel arose from
“the notion of the inviolableness of the record.”93 In particular, it
JUDGMENTS, ch. 3, topic 2, intro. note (“Ordinarily, if the judgment was rendered for the plaintiff,
the claim is held to be extinguished and merged in the judgment; if the judgment was rendered
for the defendant, the claim is likewise held to be extinguished, and the judgment is a bar to a
second action on the same claim.”).
89. Hallco Mfg. Co. v. Foster, 256 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The general concept
of claim preclusion is that when a final judgment is rendered on the merits, another action may
not be maintained between the parties on the same ‘claim,’ and defenses that were raised or could
have been raised in that action are extinguished.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18;
see also Migra, 465 U.S. at 77 n.1 (“Claim preclusion refers to the effect of a judgment in
foreclosing litigation of a matter that never has been litigated, because of a determination that it
should have been advanced in an earlier suit. Claim preclusion therefore encompasses the law of
merger and bar.”).
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19 (“It is frequently said that a valid and final
personal judgment for the defendant will bar another action on the same claim only if the judgment
is rendered ‘on the merits.’”). “On the merits” generally means after resolution of the substantive
issues in the case, though it could also include judgments that a statute or rule of the court provides
will operate as an adjudication on the merits. Id.
91. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (noting that claim preclusion applies
“whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the earlier suit” (quoting New
Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001))); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24.
Exemplifying the private nature of claim preclusion and its emphasis on claim identity, the Federal
Circuit has found, for example, that a judgment of infringement and no invalidity of patent claims
would only bar a later validity challenge to those claims under the doctrine of claim preclusion if
the accused device in the second suit was “essentially the same” as the device at issue in the prior
judgment, such that the second suit could be said to involve the same claim or transaction as the
prior judgment. Hallco Mfg., 256 F.3d at 1295–97.
92. Bursak, supra note 84, at 1663–65 (quoting Millar, supra note 87, at 45). AngloNorman estoppel was first incorporated into English law as “estoppel by record” between the
1100s and 1300s. Id. at 1664; Millar, supra note 87, at 44–45.
93. Bursak, supra note 84, at 1663; Millar, supra note 87, at 45; accord MELVILLE M.
BIGELOW, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL OR OF INCONTESTABLE RIGHTS 8 (James N. Carter
ed., 6th ed. rev. 1913) (“[T]he record has conclusive effect upon all the world. It imports absolute
verity, not only against the parties to it and those in privity with them, but against strangers
also . . . .”); Colin Hugh Buckley, Issue Preclusion and Issues of Law: A Doctrinal Framework
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prevented parties from later disputing matters that were already
established by the record of earlier proceedings, whether by admission or
by judicial decision, in any later case touching on any type of claim.94
Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion in
American law is nuanced, its modern form essentially provides that
“[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a
valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the
judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between
the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.”95 Any
determination, whether of “evidentiary fact, of ‘ultimate fact’ (that is, the
application of law to fact), or of law,” may be foreclosed via estoppel.96
Early in American law, a party could not assert collateral estoppel unless
both parties participated in the prior action, a requirement known as
mutuality.97 However, in a 1971 case, the Supreme Court abolished the
requirement of mutuality in patent cases, holding that estoppel could
apply to any party that had a “full and fair opportunity to litigate” the
issue in the prior proceeding.98
The requirement that the party to be estopped must have had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issue arises from principles of procedural
due process that have since been incorporated into the common law of
estoppel.99 “[T]he federal common law of preclusion is, of course, subject
Based on Rules of Recognition, Jurisdiction and Legal History, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 875, 879, 901
(1987) (noting that estoppel “sought to protect the integrity of the court,” by assuring that judicial
decisions “are well-regarded and not immediately subject to a ‘second opinion’”).
94. Bursak, supra note 84, at 1663–64; Millar, supra note 87, at 45.
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27; accord Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892 (“Issue
preclusion, in contrast, bars ‘successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and
resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment,’ even if the issue recurs in
the context of a different claim.” (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748–49
(2001))); Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414 (2000) (“It is the general rule that issue
preclusion attaches only ‘[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a
valid and final judgment . . . .’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27)); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27, cmt. h. (noting that issue preclusion should not
apply where the judgment is not necessarily dependent upon the determination of an issue,
because such a determination would ordinarily not be subject to appeal and thus might not have
been adequately considered).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27, cmt. c.
97. Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 645 (1936), overruled in part by Blonder-Tongue
Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
98. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 329. In Parklane Hosiery, the Supreme Court further
extended collateral estoppel to “offensive” uses against defendants. Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331–32 (1979).
99. 18 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, § 132.04 (“A determination can have
issue preclusive (or collateral estoppel) effect only if the proceeding in which it was made afforded
the party against whom estoppel is asserted a hearing on that issue that comports with due
process.”); see also Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 329 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40
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to due process limitations.”100 To comply with principles of due process,
the party to be estopped must at least have had the opportunity to present
the issue at a hearing101 before an impartial tribunal102 with the
opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses103 and a decision on the
record.104 When based on administrative agency decisions, preclusion
may only apply if the agency made the decision in a “judicial
capacity.”105 The element of fairness may implicate additional
considerations, which a court must weigh holistically according to a
“sense of justice and equity” to determine whether estoppel should apply.
These additional considerations include “incentive to litigate,” “whether
the first validity determination purported to employ the standards” of law
then in force, and “whether without fault of his own the [party to be
estopped] was deprived of crucial evidence or witnesses in the first
litigation.”106 The Restatement provides certain other “essential elements
(1940)) (“Some litigants—those who never appeared in a prior action—may not be collaterally
estopped without litigating the issue. They have never had a chance to present their evidence and
arguments on the claim. Due process prohibits estopping them despite one or more existing
adjudications of the identical issue which stand squarely against their position.”); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27, cmt. e (“A judgment is not conclusive in a subsequent action as to
issues which might have been but were not litigated and determined in the prior action.”). Some
cases have also held that these due process limitations apply to res judicata. E.g., Kremer v. Chem.
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 n.22 (1982) (“While our previous expressions of the requirement
of a full and fair opportunity to litigate have been in the context of collateral estoppel or issue
preclusion, it is clear from what follows that invocation of res judicata or claim preclusion is
subject to the same limitation.”).
100. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 891 (citing Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 797 (1996)).
101. 18 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 84, § 132.04; see also Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Baldwin v. Hale, 68
U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863).
102. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
271 (1970).
103. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269; cf. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012) (“A party is entitled to
present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to
conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts.”).
104. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271 (“[T]he decision maker should state the reasons for his
determination and indicate the evidence he relied on . . . .”).
105. Cf. United States v. Utah Const. & Min. Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966) (noting in dicta,
“When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of
fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts
have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose.”); see also B&B Hardware v. Hargis
Indus., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015) (“[A] court should give preclusive effect to TTAB decisions
if the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met.”). Whether common law preclusion could
apply where statutory estoppel does not is beyond the scope of this Article.
106. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333–34 (1971); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27, cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (“There are many
reasons why a party may choose not to raise an issue, or to contest an assertion, in a particular
action. The action may involve so small an amount that litigation of the issue may cost more than
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of adjudication” in order for preclusion to satisfy due process
requirements, one of which highlights the need for a proceeding with
sufficient time and space for consideration of the issues to be
precluded.107
2. Limitations Arising from The Imputed Common Law
Imputing the common law of estoppel requires that a party only be
estopped from raising issues that it had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate, according to the standards of procedural due process, in the prior
proceeding.108 Therefore, if a petitioner fails to include grounds for
unpatentability in its petition for review, or if PTAB declines to institute
review for any reason, a petitioner cannot be estopped from asserting
those grounds for invalidity in a later proceeding because the issues were
not subject to a hearing, cross-examination, a decision on the record, and
other requirements of a “full and fair opportunity to litigate” under the
common law. In other words, when the common law is imputed into the
meaning of “estoppel” and “estopped” in the AIA, statutory estoppel
under the AIA can apply only to those grounds on which the PTAB
instituted and conducted a review and issued a decision on the merits.
The imputed common law aligns precisely with the narrow, textualist
reading of the AIA’s estoppel provisions presented above.
Imputing the common law of estoppel could also have the surprising
effect of curbing the PTAB’s untoward practice of “panel stacking” if
courts applying this paradigm find that stacked panels are not “impartial
tribunals” decided in a “judicial capacity” and therefore do not satisfy the
prerequisites for estoppel. In 2015, an attorney for the USPTO stated in
oral argument before the Federal Circuit that the Director of the Patent
the value of the lawsuit. Or the forum may be an inconvenient one in which to produce the
necessary evidence or in which to litigate at all. The interests of conserving judicial resources, of
maintaining consistency, and of avoiding oppression or harassment of the adverse party are less
compelling when the issue on which preclusion is sought has not actually been litigated before.
And if preclusive effect were given to issues not litigated, the result might serve to discourage
compromise, to decrease the likelihood that the issues in an action would be narrowed by
stipulation, and thus to intensify litigation. It is true that it is sometimes difficult to determine
whether an issue was actually litigated; even if it was not litigated, the party's reasons for not
litigating in the prior action may be such that preclusion would be appropriate. But the policy
considerations outlined above weigh strongly in favor of nonpreclusion, and it is in the interest of
predictability and simplicity for such a result to obtain uniformly.”).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(2)(e) (“Such other procedural elements as
may be necessary to constitute the proceeding a sufficient means of conclusively determining the
matter in question, having regard for the magnitude and complexity of the matter in question, the
urgency with which the matter must be resolved, and the opportunity of the parties to obtain
evidence and formulate legal contentions.”).
108. See supra Part II.F.1.
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Office on occasion added additional administrative law judges to a PTAB
panel to ensure the results the USPTO wanted.109 The USPTO explained
this practice as an acceptable means of executing the Director’s policy
goals.110 Regardless of whether this practice is permissible as a whole,
which is beyond the scope of this Article, post-grant proceedings decided
in this manner may not comport with the imputed due process
prerequisites under the common law of estoppel—namely the
requirement that to comply with procedural due process a decision to be
estopped must be made by an impartial tribunal. Courts imputing the
common law requirements of estoppel to the AIA’s statutory estoppel
provisions could choose not to apply estoppel to decisions rendered by
impartial stacked panels.

109. Oral Argument at 47:13, Yissum Research Dev. Co. of the Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem
v. Sony Corp. 626 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Nos. 15-1342, 15-1343),
http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2015-1342.mp3.
USPTO: And, there’s really only one outlier decision, the SkyHawke decision,
and there are over twenty decisions involving joinder where the—
Judge Taranto: And, anytime there has been a seeming other-outlier you’ve
engaged the power to reconfigure the panel so as to get the result you want?
USPTO: Yes, your Honor.
Judge Taranto: And, you don’t see a problem with that?
USPTO: Your Honor, the Director is trying to ensure that her policy position is
being enforced by the panels.
Judge Taranto: The Director is not given adjudicatory authority, right, under § 6
of the statute that gives it to the Board?
USPTO: Right. To clarify, the Director is a member of the Board. But, your
Honor is correct—
Judge Taranto: But after the panel is chosen, I’m not sure I see the authority there
to engage in case specific re-adjudication from the Director after the panel has
been selected.
USPTO: That’s correct, once the panel has been set, it has the adjudicatory
authority and the—
Judge Taranto: Until, in your view, it’s reset by adding a few members who will
come out the other way?
USPTO: That’s correct, your Honor. We believe that’s what Alappat holds.
Id.
110. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss6/1

26

Laser: The Scope of IPR Estoppel: A Statutory, Historical, and Normative

2018]

THE SCOPE OF IPR ESTOPPEL

1153

G. Administrative Agency Deference
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,111 the Supreme Court stated that courts must defer to an agency’s
“reasonable interpretation” of “ambiguous” terms in statutes that the
agency “administers”—known as Chevron deference.112 However, for
Chevron deference to apply, there must be either an explicit or implicit
delegation of law-making authority to the agency with respect to the issue
to be decided—such as if the statute grants the agency rulemaking
authority or charges the agency with sole enforcement—and the position
to receive deference must have been promulgated pursuant to that
authority.113 Particularly if it is applied more broadly than this, but even
in its ordinary course, Chevron deference raises serious questions of
compatibility with the Constitution’s principles of separation of powers
and nondelegation.114 Perhaps, like all rules of statutory construction,
there is no requirement under stare decisis to continue to apply Chevron
deference in later cases involving different interpretative questions and

111. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
112. Id. 842–44.
113. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (“We hold that
administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference
when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying
the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 2071, 2094 (1990) (“Chevron applies only when an agency is exercising the power to
make rules or otherwise carrying out legislatively delegated interpretive authority. . . . If agencies
are simply interpreting a statute, but have not been granted the power to ‘administer’ it, the
principle of deference should not apply.”); see also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649
(1990) (“A precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of
administrative authority.”).
114. E.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge
amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems
more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design. . . . Transferring
the job of saying what the law is from the judiciary to the executive unsurprisingly invites the
very sort of due process (fair notice) and equal protection concerns the framers knew would arise
if the political branches intruded on judicial functions.”); Sunstein, supra note 113, at 2074 (“This
principle is quite jarring to those who recall the suggestion, found in Marbury v. Madison [, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803),] and repeated time and again in American public law, that it is
for judges, and no one else, to ‘say what the law is.’”). Chevron deference also does not fit within
a textualist interpretive regime because it uses extrinsic, later-derived, and potentially everchanging sources to derive a text’s meaning.
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different statutory schemes.115 Yet, rightly or wrongly, it is one of the
most entrenched statutory interpretative canons.116
The PTAB has generally adopted a broad reading of the AIA’s
statutory estoppel provisions to find that a party is estopped from raising
grounds that it could have included in the petition for review but did
not.117 Nonetheless, Chevron does not require courts to abide by the
PTAB’s interpretation of these provisions. First, the AIA does not
delegate law-making authority to the USPTO to promulgate or
“administer” the law of the estoppel provisions. Although the USPTO
may on occasion apply the estoppel provisions to later USPTO
proceedings, the statute does not delegate interpretive authority
exclusively to the USPTO, but rather provides that courts, the ITC, and
the USPTO each have independent authority to apply statutory estoppel
following post-grant proceedings.118 Indeed, the AIA grants the USPTO
rulemaking authority over some procedures for post-grant proceedings,
but does not do the same with respect to the estoppel provisions.119
Second, decisions of isolated PTAB panels do not rise to the level of
agency rulemaking that is ordinarily entitled to Chevron deference.120
Third, the AIA’s estoppel provisions are sufficiently clear to be
interpreted by the court using traditional tools of statutory construction,
leaving no gap to be filled by administrative agency deference. 121 As
described above, the qualifier “during that . . . review” can have only one
plain meaning when read in the context of the overall statutory scheme:
limiting the triggering events for estoppel to those occurring during the
pendency of the review, that is, after institution.122 Because the statute is
unambiguous, “that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.”123
115. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1157–58 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron is a
procedural rule, and procedural rules generally receive little precedential consideration when
experience proves them problematic in their administration.”); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra
note 45, at 87, 412; Frickey, supra note 47, at 1976, 1981 (discussing the role of stare decisis in
interpretive regime change).
116. See Sunstein, supra note 113, at 2074–75 (describing the extensive citation of Chevron).
117. Discussed in more detail infra Part III.B.
118. 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e), 325(e) (2012).
119. Compare id. § 316 with id. § 315(e).
120. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (finding that Customs ruling
letters do not rise to the level of Chevron deference).
121. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2018) (“Even under Chevron, we owe
an agency's interpretation of the law no deference unless, after ‘employing traditional tools of
statutory construction,’ we find ourselves unable to discern Congress's meaning.” (quoting
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984))).
122. Supra Part II.B–F.
123. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
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H. Impact of Legislative History
Some patent stakeholders disagree with the narrow reading presented
here, arguing that the provision should be read broadly because
congressional records suggest that Congress and testifying stakeholders
intended a broad reading of the provision.124 However, this approach fails
to conform to the Supreme Court’s current textualist method of statutory
interpretation. As explained above, constitutional principles of
bicameralism and presentment demand that the text of the statute itself,
rather than Congress’s unenacted intentions, be the authoritative source
of statutory interpretation.125 Although courts sometimes use legislative
history to confirm a reading arrived at via a textualist approach, courts
may not use legislative history to contradict the clear text of a statute.126
Even if a court determines that legislative intent should influence the
interpretation of a law, it should be cautious of using legislative history,
rather than the text itself, to infer that intent. Legislative history is an
imperfect measure of the intent behind the law for many reasons:
Statements made in debates may be merely strategic and may not
represent the views of all of those passing the legislation, and even
committee reports speak, at best, for the committee’s majority, rather than
for the majority of legislators who voted for the legislation. 127 In
124. E.g., Robert L. Stoll, Maintaining Post-Grant Review Estoppel in the American Invents
Act Revisited: A Call for Legislative Restraint, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 15, 53 (2013) (arguing for a broad
scope of estoppel that would extend to any grounds that reasonably could have been raised in the
petition for review). See infra Part IV.C for a discussion of the legislative history.
125. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (“[T]he
authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic
material”); Easterbrook, supra note 51, at 82 (“Intents are irrelevant even if discernable (which
they aren’t), because our Constitution provides for the enactment and approval of texts, not of
intents. The text is not evidence of the law; it is the law.”).
126. See Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 574 (2011) (“Legislative history, for those
who take it into account, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.”); Easterbrook, supra note
51, at 81 (“[Supreme Court Justices] never use legislative history to contradict a statute but
sometimes use it to confirm statutory meaning arrived at, they tell us, by other means.”). What
purpose a confirmation of a meaning already decided may serve beyond satisfying intellectual
curiosity is unclear. Under an appropriate textualist methodology, courts would not use legislative
history even for the purposes of parsing ambiguities or confirming a meaning arrived at by other
means.
127. See Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. at 568 (“[J]udicial reliance on legislative materials like
committee reports, which are not themselves subject to the requirements of Article I, may give
unrepresentative committee members—or, worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists—both the
power and the incentive to attempt strategic manipulations of legislative history to secure results
they were unable to achieve through the statutory text.”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 45, at
376–77 (noting that floor statements are often delivered to a nearly empty chamber, sometime
solely for the purpose of “mak[ing] legislative history”) (“[T]he only thing that one can say for
sure was agreed to by both houses and the President (on signing the bill) is the text of the statute.
The rest is legal fiction.”); Easterbrook, supra note 51, at 81, 90–91, 94–96 (criticizing the practice
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legislative history, “the median legislator is silent.”128 In contrast, the text
speaks for all who passed the legislation.
Some recent cases state that legislative history might have value, at
the periphery, to aid understanding of ambiguous terms.129 Indeed, even
under a true textualist approach, legislative history may have value in
deducing the contemporaneous meaning of ambiguous terms, the
meaning of which cannot be deduced from the text itself—not because
the legislature’s understanding determines the meaning of ambiguous
terms, but because legislators are themselves members of the
contemporaneous population and their contemporaneous statements are
extrinsic evidence of contemporary understanding.130 Even so, legislative
history is often not the best source of the meaning of terms as they were
understood by the contemporaneous interpretive community. For modern
texts, a plethora of contemporaneous dictionaries are available to
determine the unbiased, ordinary meaning of terms. Use of legislative
history as evidence of contemporaneous understanding is dangerous
when other sources are available because it invites conflation of the
legislator’s intended meaning with the actual contemporaneous meaning
of those terms. Therefore, legislative history should generally not be used
over dictionaries and other less prejudicial evidence to determine the
meaning of terms in recently-passed statutes. For those statutes, like the
AIA, the potential benefits of using legislative history as a proxy for
contemporaneous understanding are sufficiently low that they do not
outweigh the risk of conflating legislators’ intended meaning with
contemporaneous understanding.
Admittedly, the legislative history of the AIA reflects that for IPR
(though not for PGR or CBMR), at least those outspoken members of
Congress who discussed the issue of estoppel on the floor or in committee
of “quot[ing] freely from legislators who favored [a particular approach to the legislation], or at
least were neutral, whether or not that person had any influence” on the ultimate text of the
legislation and noting the extensive time commitment that would be required of judges to
adequately determine which statements reflect influence in the passage of the legislation and
which do not); see also Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652, 1661 (2017)
(referring to “excerpts from committee hearings and scattered floor statements by individual
lawmakers” as “lowly sources” that are “among the least illuminating forms of legislative
history”).
128. Easterbrook, supra note 51, at 91.
129. Milner, 562 U.S. at 572 (“Those of us who make use of legislative history believe that
clear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous text. We will not take the
opposite tack of allowing ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language.”);
Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. at 568 (“Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only
to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise
ambiguous terms.”).
130. See Easterbrook, supra note 51, at 91–92 (“Meaning depends not on the contents of the
speaker’s head, but on the reaction of the contemporaneous interpretive community.”).
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reports intended a broad estoppel that extended to grounds that
reasonably could have been included in the petition for review. 131 The
legislative history of the AIA’s estoppel provisions is described further
below in detail.132 However, under the Supreme Court’s current textualist
approach to statutory interpretation, this legislative intent cannot alter the
plain meaning of the statute derived from its text.133 Constitutional
principles demand that Congress execute its intent through the text.134 If
Congress intended a broad estoppel, the drafters of the AIA failed to
accomplish this. It is now for Congress, not the courts, to correct the AIA
via statutory amendment if it still believes it appropriate.
I. Impact of Policy Arguments
Principles of statutory interpretation likewise caution against reading
a law to satisfy policy goals when the plain meaning of the statute
supports a different reading.135 In addition to the constitutional issues
raised above, judges are less equipped than the legislature to determine
the likely impact of particular interpretations of law and to choose from
among the policy goals that should be served. Although Congress may
hear commentary from diverse stakeholders as to how the laws will affect
them or request social science or economics studies and await their results
before acting, a judge often has far more limited information available
and may, in the worst case, substitute her own reasoning for careful policy
decisions on issues covered by statute. The judiciary is not designed for
policy making on issues where Congress has already acted, but for
interpreting laws according to the laws’ terms.136
Under a textualist framework, pragmatism should have no role in the
sound construction of statutory provisions, whether favorable to a
textualist interpretation or not. Nonetheless, for completeness, the policy
implications of competing interpretations of the AIA’s estoppel provision
are discussed in detail below in Part V. As described there, a narrow scope
of estoppel furthers the patent quality goals that formed the primary
impetus for passage of the AIA.

131. Infra Part IV.C.
132. Infra Part IV.C.
133. Milner, 562 U.S. at 574; Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. at 568.
134. Supra Part II.A.1.
135. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987) (per curiam) (“Deciding what
competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the
very essence of legislative choice—and it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent
simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the law.”);
see also SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2018) (“Policy arguments are properly
addressed to Congress, not this Court.”).
136. See Easterbrook, supra note 51, at 82 (“I am leery of pragmatic arguments because they
simultaneously depart from the enacted texts and give too much power to judges.”).
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***
As explained above, the Supreme Court’s modern, textualist approach
to statutory construction demands a narrow reading of the AIA’s statutory
estoppel provisions. Under this reading, a petitioner would not be
estopped from raising, in later litigation, any grounds for invalidity that
it could not litigate during the pendency of the post-grant proceeding,
either because the PTAB declined institution for any reason or because
the petitioner chose not to include the ground in its petition for review.
This Article now turns to the current judicial approach to IPR estoppel
before discussing, for the sake of completeness, the considerations that
do not apply to this textualist approach to statutory interpretation, namely
the legislative history of the AIA’s estoppel provisions and the policy
justifications of a narrow estoppel following post-grant proceedings.
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF POST-GRANT ESTOPPEL
The Federal Circuit has not yet had occasion to address, in a
precedential decision, how the AIA’s estoppel provisions should be read
when applied to grounds that the petitioner reasonably could have raised
in its petition for IPR, PGR, or CBMR but did not. The Supreme Court
likewise has not addressed this issue. In light of the foregoing statutory
analysis, when the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court next reviews the
appropriate scope of the AIA’s estoppel provisions, it should adopt a
narrow reading. Although the Federal Circuit adopted a narrow reading
of the statutory text in pre-SAS Industries cases involving the estoppel
effect of non-instituted grounds, such as Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v.
Automated Creel Systems, Inc.137 and HP Inc. v. MPHJ Technology
Investments, LLC,138 some district courts and the PTAB found that those
decisions merely stood for a limited exception to estoppel if the PTAB
declines review of certain grounds for redundancy (without substantive
consideration) and grants partial institution to others.139 Following the
Supreme Court’s decision in SAS Industries, which requires the PTAB to
institute review on all grounds raised in the petition or none, 140 the
specific factual scenarios addressed in Shaw and HP can no longer arise.
137. 817 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 374 (2016).
138. 817 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
139. E.g., Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1033 (E.D.
Wis. 2017); Cobalt Boats, LLC v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-00021-HCM-LRL, 2017
WL 2605977 at *2–3 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2017); Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Meyer Prods. LLC,
No. 14-cv-886-jdp, 2017 WL 1382556, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 18, 2017); Great W. Cas. Co. v.
Intellectual Ventures II LLC, No. IPR2016-01534, at 12 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017). A “ground”
in PTAB practice refers to a basis for unpatentability, such as obviousness over a specific
combination of prior art. A petition for review may include multiple grounds for unpatentability.
140. SAS Inst. Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 1354–60.
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Nonetheless, this and other precedent on the estoppel effect of noninstituted grounds remains informative in the interpretation of the
appropriate scope of the AIA’s estoppel provisions.
A. The Federal Circuit
In Shaw Industries, petitioner Shaw sought a writ of mandamus
instructing the PTAB to reevaluate a decision not to institute review on
certain grounds for unpatentability on the basis that those grounds were
redundant with other instituted grounds.141 Shaw argued for mandamus
on the basis that, “because it brought the Payne-based ground in its
petition and the PTO denied IPR on that ground, it may be estopped from
arguing the ground in any future proceedings.”142 The USPTO, in its
opposing briefs, argued that under a plain reading of § 315(e)(2), “the
denied ground never became part of the IPR.”143 The Federal Circuit
agreed with the USPTO, holding that, under a plain reading, the Paynebased ground was not raised “during that inter partes review”:
Both parts of § 315(e) create estoppel for arguments “on
any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could
have raised during that inter partes review.” Shaw raised its
Payne-based ground in its petition for IPR. [T]he PTO
denied the petition as to that ground, thus no IPR was
instituted on that ground. The IPR does not begin until it is
instituted. See Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1272 (“IPRs proceed in
two phases. In the first phase, the PTO determines whether
to institute IPR. In the second phase, the Board conducts the
IPR proceeding and issues a final decision.” (citations
omitted)). Thus, Shaw did not raise—nor could it have
reasonably raised—the Payne-based ground during the IPR.
The plain language of the statute prohibits the application of
estoppel under these circumstances.144
Shortly after Shaw, the Federal Circuit again held in HP that estoppel
does not apply to grounds that the petitioner raised but that the PTAB did
not institute as part of the IPR on the basis of redundancy. 145 Together,
these cases at least made clear that when the PTAB declines to institute
141. Shaw, 817 F.3d at 1299.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1300 (quoting Brief for Intervenor – Dir. of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
at 38, Shaw, 817 F.3d 1293 (No. 15-1116)).
144. Id.
145. HP Inc. v. MPHJ Tech. Inv., LLC, 817 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he
noninstituted grounds do not become a part of the IPR. Accordingly, the noninstituted grounds
were not raised and, as review was denied, could not be raised in the IPR. Therefore, the estoppel
provisions of § 315(e)(1) do not apply.”).
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review of grounds raised in the petition on the basis of redundancy, rather
than on a substantive basis, estoppel does not extend to those grounds.
Hinting at possible extension of this logic, in early 2017, the Federal
Circuit issued a nonprecedential opinion denying a petition for
mandamus in In re Verinata Health.146 The court found no clear abuse of
discretion in the lower court’s findings: (1) estoppel does not apply to
grounds raised in the petition, but on which the Board declined to institute
review for substantive reasons (because it found there was no likelihood
of success on those grounds); and (2) estoppel does apply to grounds that
are merely a subset of instituted obviousness combinations.147
Additionally, consistent with statutory language that estoppel applies
only where “a claim in a patent under this chapter . . . results in a final
written decision,”148 the Federal Circuit has held that estoppel does not
apply to grounds for invalidity of a patent claim where the PTAB declines
to institute review of the claim on any ground and thus does not address
that claim in its final written decision.149
Another Federal Circuit case that supports a narrow definition of
“review” or “proceeding” in the AIA’s estoppel provisions is Intellectual
Ventures II v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.150 At issue in that case was the
scope of the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction pursuant to AIA §
18(b), which provides for “immediate interlocutory appeal from a district
court’s decision” to stay district court proceedings “relating to a
transitional [CBMR] proceeding for that patent.”151 The Federal Circuit
held that the word “proceeding” in this statutory provision only refers to
the period following institution and does not permit appeal from a stay
decision relating only to a petition for a CBMR proceeding.152 Looking
to the statutory context, the Federal Circuit noted that the “AIA
differentiates between a petition for a CBMR proceeding” and the
proceeding itself, such as in the phrase “petition for a [CBMR]
146. No. 17-109, 2017 WL 1422489 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 9, 2017), writ denied, Verinata Health,
Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc, No. 12-CV-05501-SI, 2017 WL 235048 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017).
147. See id. at *2.
148. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012).
149. Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1052–53 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(holding that the PTAB institutes review “on a claim-by-claim basis,” such that where the PTAB
declined to institute review of certain claims in a CBMR, “estoppel does not apply to those noninstituted claims,” even though § 101 grounds for invalidity were raised with respect to both the
instituted and non-instituted claims); see also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d
1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he statute is quite clear that the PTO can choose whether to
institute inter partes review on a claim-by-claim basis.”), overruled on other grounds by Aqua
Prod., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
150. 781 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
151. Id. at 1375 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
sec. 18(b) 125 Stat. 284, 331 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.)).
152. Id. at 1376 (alteration in original) (quoting AIA sec. 18(a)(1)(B)).
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proceeding,” which the Federal Circuit said suggests that the petition is a
request for a proceeding, not part of the proceeding.153 If the logic of this
case were applied to the estoppel provisions, the phrase “during
that . . . review,” and certainly the phrase “during that transitional
proceeding,” could only be read as referring to the time period following
institution.
B. PTAB
The PTAB has interpreted Shaw as holding that no statutory estoppel
applies where the petitioner raised the ground in its petition but the PTAB
granted only partial institution and declined to institute review on that
ground, either on the basis of redundancy or for substantive reasons.154
However, both before and after Shaw, the PTAB has taken a broad view
of estoppel as to grounds that the petitioner failed to include in its petition
for review.155 Adopting Senator Kyl’s approach, the PTAB will apply
estoppel to any grounds that it finds the petitioner reasonably could have
located through a diligent search and included in the petition for
review.156 For example, the PTAB has found that if a prior art reference
was cited during prosecution or cited by the petitioner in earlier
proceedings, the petitioner could have raised that ground in its petition
for review and would be estopped from raising it in later proceedings.157
For grounds not previously cited, the PTAB conducts an assessment of
the availability of the materials to determine whether they could
153. Id.
154. Great W. Cas. Co. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, No. IPR2016-01534, at 12–13
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017) (discerning “that Shaw Industries Group held that estoppel does not
apply to any ground of unpatentability that was presented in a petition, but denied institution,” but
noting that there is “a substantive distinction between a ground that a petitioner attempted to raise,
but was denied a trial, and a ground that a petitioner could have raised, but elected not to raise in
its previous petition or petitions”).
155. Apotex Inc. v. Wyeth LLC, No. IPR2015-00873, at 8 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 16, 2015); Johns
Manville Corp. v. Knauf Insulation Inc., No. IPR2016-00130, at 12–15 (P.T.A.B. May 8, 2017);
Great West Cas., No. IPR2016-01534, at 15–16; Ford Motor Co. v. Paice, No. IPR2015-00722,
at 6–8 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 26, 2016); Praxair Distribution Inc. v. INO Therapeutics LLC., No.
IPR2016-00781, at 10 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 25, 2016). The practical effects of the PTAB’s approach
to estoppel may be limited, however. In SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, the Supreme Court indicated
that the AIA gives the USPTO discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review. 138 S. Ct.
1348, 1351 (2018) (“§ 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on the question whether to
institute review . . . .”) (emphasis in original). Combined with the unappealability of institution
decisions, 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), there is little to stop the PTAB from simply denying institution in
any circumstance it pleases.
156. See, e.g., Johns Manville Corp., No. IPR2016-00130, at 12–15; Great West Cas., No.
IPR2016-01534, at 15–16 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017); Ford Motor, No. IPR2015-00722, at 6–8;
Praxair Distribution Inc., No. IPR2016-00781, at 10; Apotex, No. IPR2015-00873, at 8.
157. Ford Motor, No. IPR2015-00722, at 6–8; Apotex, No. IPR2015-00873, at 8.
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reasonably have been found.158 The approach fails to comport with sound
principles of statutory construction and adds unnecessary complexity to
the decision of whether to apply estoppel.
C. District Courts
District courts are split in their interpretation of the AIA’s estoppel
provisions, particularly as to whether a petitioner is estopped from raising
art that it could have, but did not, raise in its petition for review.
1. Non-Instituted Grounds Raised in Petition
After Shaw, and before SAS Industries prohibited partial institution,
most district courts held that estoppel did not apply as to grounds that
were raised in the petition but not instituted, regardless of whether the
PTAB declined to institute on redundancy grounds159 or because the
PTAB believed the ground was not reasonably likely to succeed.160
Moreover, courts agree that estoppel does not apply to any grounds for
invalidity of a patent claim where the PTAB declines to institute on any
grounds for that claim.161
Nonetheless, a few district courts that disagree with Shaw’s approach
to interpreting statutory estoppel have found a way around it. When
determining whether to stay court proceedings pending the results of IPRs
and PGRs, some courts have required parties to stipulate, as a condition
of the stay, to a broader scope of estoppel than that likely appropriate
under Shaw.162 For example, in a recent case in the Eastern District of
Texas, the court suggested that it would only stay the case pending an
IPR if the defendant, who was the IPR petitioner, “stipulates that for any
claims surviving IPR, [it] will not assert a defense under §§ 102 or 103
based on prior art that it raised or reasonably could have raised in its IPR
petitions,” noting that “‘reasonably could have raised’ would be prior art
158. Johns Manville, No. IPR2016-00130, at 12–15; Great West Cas., No. IPR2016-01534,
at 15–16; Praxair Distribution Inc., No. IPR2016-00781, at 10.
159. Illumina Inc. v. Qiagen N.V., 207 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1088–89 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (finding
no estoppel applies to grounds not instituted as redundant).
160. Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc, No. 12-CV-05501-SI, 2017 WL
235048, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017) (finding estoppel did not apply to obviousness over a
combination of Quake and Craig, a ground on which the PTAB declined to institute review as not
reasonably likely to succeed).
161. Depomed Inc. v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 3:13-cv-00571, 2017 WL 5508538, at *16–
18 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2016) (finding that the defendant was not estopped from challenging noninstituted claims on the basis of prior art asserted in the IPR petition). This comports with the
statutory language, wherein estoppel only applies if there is an “inter partes review of a claim in
a patent under this chapter that results in a final written decision.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(e).
162. E.g., Infernal Tech., LLC v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. 215CV01523JRGRSP, 2016 WL
9000458, at *4, *4 n.5 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2016).
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that a ‘skilled searcher conducting a diligent search reasonably could
have been expected to discover’” and that this would “includ[e] any
applicable references cited in [its] invalidity contentions or relied upon
by [its] expert witness in his opening expert report regarding
invalidity.”163 The court then deferred resolution of the motion to stay
pending defendant’s “decision” on whether to enter the requested
stipulation.164 A court offering such a deal wields immense power over
the defendant, which the court uses to usurp the precedent of higher
courts and thereby harm the orderly administration of justice. Such deals
are likely to continue to rise in popularity absent a crystal-clear decision
on the scope of estoppel from the Federal Circuit, an aberrant appellate
review of a denial of stay should a party refuse such a deal, 165 or
legislative action to clarify the conditions of stay pending IPR and PGR
and provide direct appellate review of those decisions, as the statute
provides for CBMR.166
2. Grounds Not Raised in Petition
District courts are fiercely split, however, in their interpretation of the
AIA’s estoppel provisions as applied to grounds for invalidity that the
petitioner did not raise in its petition for review. Some lower courts have
read into the estoppel provision language that does not exist in its text,
finding that the estoppel applies to grounds that were raised or reasonably
could have been raised in the party’s petition for IPR or PGR, including
art that the petitioner reasonably could have located after a diligent
search.167 Relying primarily on legislative history to determine the
163. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting 157 CONG. REC. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011)
(statement of Sen. Kyl)).
164. Id. at *1.
165. Ordinarily, a district court’s decision of whether to grant a stay is not appealable. See
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 549 F.3d 842, 847 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining
a limited exception where appellate review of a decision to stay may be appropriate where other
interlocutory orders that are properly appealed necessarily implicate the stay decision and
providing that such review is for an abuse of discretion).
166. For CBMR only, the AIA sets out factors that a court must consider whether deciding
whether to enter a stay, provides for immediate interlocutory review of the stay decision, and
provides that such review may be de novo. AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 18(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284,
331 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). The Federal Circuit,
interpreting this statute, recently overturned a district court’s decision to deny a stay in a CBMR,
finding, inter alia, that the PTAB’s decision to institute review on all claims of the asserted patent
“strongly favor[s] . . . a stay.” VirtualAgility Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F.3d 1307, 1313
(Fed. Cir. 2014).
167. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1033 (E.D. Wis.
2017); Network-1 Techs., Inc. v. Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc., No. 6:11-CV-00492-RWS, 2017 WL
4856473, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2017) (“The statute provides that a party is estopped from
asserting at trial invalidity grounds that it reasonably could have raised during an IPR, and non-
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appropriate scope of the estoppel provision, these cases fail to give
sufficient weight to the text of the statute and the context in which its
words appear.168
On the other hand, several other district courts have read Shaw as
limiting estoppel only to those grounds that were raised in the petition,
instituted, and subject to a written decision.169 These courts recognize that
Shaw’s textualist approach demands a narrow reading.170 Some of these
courts have also noted the absurdity, given the space constraints of PTAB
petitions, of requiring a petitioner to include all prior art it could have
located in its petition for IPR under risk of estoppel.171
petitioned grounds that could have been included in an IPR petition are precisely those grounds.”);
Cobalt Boats, LLC, v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-00021-HCM-LRL, 2017 WL 2605977
at *5–6 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2017); Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 13-CV-01015-JRG-RSP,
2017 WL 2526231, at *7 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 2017) (determining that estoppel applies to grounds
not included in a petition that the petitioner reasonably could have raised); Douglas Dynamics,
LLC v. Meyer Prods. LLC, No. 14-cv-886-jdp, 2017 WL 1382556, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 18,
2017) (“Accordingly, the court will construe the statutory language ‘any ground that the
petitioner . . . reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review’ to include nonpetitioned grounds that the defendant chose not to present in its petition to PTAB [and could have
found via a diligent search].” (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 316(e)(2) (2012)), reconsideration granted on
other grounds, No. 14-CV-886-JDP, 2017 WL 2116714 (W.D. Wis. May 15, 2017); Parallel
Networks Licensing, LLC v. IBM Corp., No. 13-2072, 2017 WL 1045912, at *11–12 (D. Del.
Feb. 22, 2017), appeal filed, No. 17-2115 (Fed. Cir. May 31, 2017); Clearlamp, LLC v. LKQ
Corp., No. 12 C 2533, 2016 WL 4734389, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2016).
168. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 271 F. Supp. 3d at 1033; Network-1 Techs., 2017 WL
4856473, at *1; Cobalt Boats, 2017 WL 2605977, at *5–6; Biscotti Inc., 2017 WL 2526231, at
*7 (determining that estoppel applies to grounds not included in a petition that the petitioner
reasonably could have raised); Douglas Dynamics, 2017 WL 1382556, at *4; Parallel Networks
Licensing, 2017 WL 1045912, at *11–12; Clearlamp, 2016 WL 4734389, at *7–8. Though, at
least one court arrived at this result using a purportedly text-based analysis. Oil-Dri Corp. of Am.
v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., No. 15-CV-1067, 2017 WL 3278915, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2017).
169. Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Wangs All. Corp., No. CV 14-12298-DJC, 2018 WL
283893, at *4 (D. Mass. Jan. 2, 2018) (“[T]he broader reading of the estoppel provision is
foreclosed by Shaw.”); Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., LLC, No. 15-CV-03295-BLF, 2017 WL
7050646, at *11 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2017) (“[E]stoppel applies only to grounds that were both
raised in the IPR petition and instituted in the IPR proceeding.”); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Toshiba Corp., 221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 553–54 (D. Del. 2016) (“Although . . . Toshiba certainly
could have raised these additional obviousness grounds based on public documents at the outset
of their IPR petition, the Federal Circuit has construed the above language quite literally.”),
reconsideration denied, 2017 WL 107980, at *1 (D. Del. Jan. 11, 2017).
170. See Koninklijke Philips N.V., 2018 WL 283893, at *4; Finjan, 2017 WL 7050646, at
*11; Intellectual Ventures, 221 F. Supp. at 553–54.
171. Intellectual Ventures, 2017 WL 107980, at *1 (denying reconsideration and noting, as
to grounds not raised in the IPR petition, that the argument that “a company that seeks an IPR
must bring to the PTAB’s attention every ground the company has reason to think might be
relevant[,] otherwise, it will be estopped from pursuing that ground in litigation . . . appears to be
inconsistent with all of the limitations imposed by the PTAB on IPR proceedings (e.g., page limits
for petitions, 14 point type, and portrait-view claim charts)”).
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3. Other
District courts agree that estoppel does not apply to combinations of
art that include prior art systems that were in public use or on sale, which
could not have been raised in the IPRs given that IPRs are limited by
statute to patents or printed publications.172
Most district courts agree that estoppel extends to grounds that are
merely a subset of instituted grounds because such subsets “reasonably
could have been raised” during the IPR.173 However, at least one court
has held otherwise when the PTAB explicitly noted that it would not
consider the subset in the review.174
IV. STATUTORY AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PRE-AIA AND AIA
ESTOPPEL PROVISIONS
A. Bayh-Dole and the AIPA
The relevant history of the AIA’s post-grant proceedings begins with
the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.175 Through passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of
1980, Congress amended the Patent Act to allow ex parte reexamination
of issued patents.176 Ex parte reexaminations permit a patent owner or a
third party to ask the Patent Office to reexamine an already-issued patent
on the basis of a substantial new question of patentability, such as certain
prior art that was not previously considered by the Patent Office.177
Congress’s stated goals in enacting ex parte reexamination were to
improve patent quality—to “strengthen[] investor confidence in the
certainty of patent rights by creating a system of administrative
reexamination of doubtful patents”—and to provide a faster and less
expensive means to test patent validity than doing so only through district
court litigation.178 Ex parte proceedings, as the name conveys, involve
172. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b); cf. Advanced Micro Devices v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 14-cv-01012SI, 2017 WL 2774339, at *6 (noting that “IPR estoppel does not effect a bar to LG’s assertion of
all combinations including Kurihara,” only combinations that were instituted and subsets thereof).
173. E.g., Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc, No. 12-CV-05501-SI, 2017 WL
235048, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017).
174. Oil-Dri Corp. of Am. v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., No. 15-CV-1067, 2017 WL
3278915, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2017).
175. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–307).
176. Id.
177. Id.; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 2216 (9th ed. 2015) [hereinafter MPEP].
178. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 6462 (1980). The Report of the House Committee on
the Judiciary notes hope that this procedure might function as an alternative to litigating validity
in court but focuses on potential benefits to the patentee, such as that the procedure potentially
allowing patentees to demonstrate the validity of their patents to third party infringers who would
otherwise use the high cost of litigation as leverage to extract cheaper licensing fees. Id. (“A new
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only the Patent Office and the patentee, with the third party having no
ability to participate beyond filing an initial request or, in certain limited
circumstances, a single reply.179
The drafters of the Bayh-Dole Act included no estoppel provision
binding third parties to the validity decisions of the Patent Office
following ex parte reexamination.180 Nonetheless, parties might have had
more difficulty challenging a patent in court following an unsuccessful
ex parte reexamination. Although the evidentiary burden does not
change, the presumption of validity afforded to patents under 35 U.S.C.
§ 282 may be more difficult to overcome where the grounds for invalidity
were considered by the Patent Office, either during the original
examination or reexamination, than if those grounds were not previously
considered.181 In the years following implementation of ex parte
reexamination, some patent stakeholders called for expanding the role of
third-party challengers in reexamination proceedings on the grounds that

patent reexamination procedure is needed to permit the owner of a patent to have the validity of
his patent tested in the Patent office where the most expert opinions exist and at a much reduced
cost. Patent office reexamination will greatly reduce, if not end, the threat of legal costs being
used to ‘blackmail’ such holders into allowing patent infringements or being forced to license
their patents for nominal fees. . . . It is anticipated that these measures provide a useful and
necessary alternative for challengers and for patent owners to test the validity of United States
patents in an efficient and relatively inexpensive manner.”).
179. See MPEP, supra note 177, § 2209 (“If ordered, the actual reexamination proceeding is
ex parte in nature.”). The third party may reply if the patentee files an opposition statement,
though the patentee rarely does so. See 35 U.S.C. § 304 (2012) (“[T]hat person [who filed the
request] may file and have considered in the reexamination a reply to any statement filed by the
patent owner.”); 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(g) (2017) (“The active participation of the ex parte
reexamination requester ends with the reply pursuant to § 1.535, and no further submissions on
behalf of the reexamination requester will be acknowledged or considered.”).
180. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–307. Note that common law estoppel would generally not apply
following ex parte administrative proceedings because the party to be estopped would have had
no full and fair opportunity to litigate. See United States v. Utah Const. & Min. Co., 384 U.S. 394,
422 (1966) (noting in dicta that preclusion would only apply to agency decisions in “which the
parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate”); cf. In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that because USPTO reexaminations and district court litigations on the
validity of the same patent are “differing proceedings with different evidentiary standards for
validity,” they are “not duplicative”).
181. Cf. Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 111 (2011) (noting that although
the presumption of validity requires invalidity to be shown by the same standard of clear and
convincing evidence in all infringement cases, “if the PTO did not have all material facts before
it, its considered judgment may lose significant force. And, concomitantly, the challenger’s
burden to persuade the jury of its invalidity defense by clear and convincing evidence may be
easier to sustain.” (citations omitted)). The presumption of validity does not apply within USPTO
proceedings. MPEP, supra note 177, § 2258 (“The statutory presumption of validity, 35 U.S.C.
282, has no application in reexamination.”).
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an expanded reexamination might be viewed as a more viable alternative
to litigation than the then-existing ex parte procedure.182
With the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA),183
Congress created a new post-grant procedure, inter partes reexamination,
with the goal to expand third party participation in reexaminations.184
With inter partes reexamination, third parties could submit a written
comment each time the patent owner filed a response, and they also had
the opportunity to appeal a decision that the patent was not unpatentable
to the USPTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, then to the
Federal Circuit.185 Congress also added a provision for estoppel wherein
the petitioner would be estopped from asserting in a later proceeding any
grounds for invalidity that the petitioner “raised or could have raised
during the inter partes reexamination proceedings”:
CIVIL ACTION.—A third-party requester whose
request for an inter partes reexamination results in an order
under section 313 is estopped from asserting at a later time,
in any civil action arising in whole or in part under section
1338 of title 28, United States Code, the invalidity of any
claim finally determined to be valid and patentable on any
ground which the third-party requester raised or could have
raised during the inter partes reexamination proceedings.
This subsection does not prevent the assertion of invalidity
based on newly discovered prior art unavailable to the thirdparty requester and the Patent and Trademark Office at the
time of the inter partes reexamination proceedings.186
The legislative history indicates that Congress added this provision
“[t]o prevent harassment” of patentees.187 The AIPA also separately
provided for estoppel of any fact determined during the reexamination:
“Any party who requests an inter partes reexamination under section 311
of title 35, United States Code, is estopped from challenging at a later
182. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM’N ON PATENT LAW REFORM, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY
14 (1992) (“The Commission also recommends providing third parties with more
opportunities for substantive participation during the reexamination proceeding. The objective of
the Commission in this regard is to build confidence in the reexamination process so that third
parties will be inclined to raise patent challenges in this forum rather than through litigation.”).
183. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-552 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 35 U.S.C.).
184. H.R. REP. NO. 106-287, pt. 1, at 6 (1999).
185. AIPA sec. 4605, § 134.
186. AIPA sec. 4604, § 315(c) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2002)).
187. H.R. REP. NO. 106-287, pt. 1, at 56 (1999) (“To prevent harassment, third-party
requesters who participate in a reexamination proceeding are estopped from raising in a
subsequent court action or reexamination any issue of patent validity that they raised or could
have raised during reexamination.”).
OF COMMERCE
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time, in any civil action, any fact determined during the process of such
reexamination . . . .”188
B. 2000–2010: Between the AIPA and the AIA
Despite high hopes for the inter partes reexamination procedures
established by the AIPA, litigants did not often use the process in its early
years.189 Commentary collected by the Patent Office reflected the largest
hurdle to adoption: Potential challengers were unsure of estoppel’s reach
under the AIPA, and they were unwilling to risk potentially broad
estoppel given the limited procedural scope of the review, especially
where petitioners lacked the ability to engage in discovery and otherwise
fully litigate the dispute.190 In the early 2000s, the Patent Office began
lobbying for an expanded post-grant review proceeding that would
provide “a genuinely contested case presided over by panels of USPTO
administrative patent judges.”191
In 2003, the House Committee on the Judiciary considered a draft bill
to remove “or could have raised” estoppel from inter partes
reexamination provisions,192 but it did not come to fruition. At the
hearing, some stakeholders argued for retention of “or could have raised”
estoppel on the grounds that a petitioner should not be permitted to harass
a patentee with serial challenges based on information it could have
included in prior reexamination requests.193 Around this time, key patent
188. AIPA sec. 4607 (uncodified).
189. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTER PARTES
REEXAMINATION 5 (2004) (“Over the past five years, the USPTO has received over 1,600,000
patent applications and issued almost 900,000 patents. Yet in the nearly five years that the
procedure has been available, only 53 inter partes reexamination requests were filed.”).
190. Id. at 4, 6 (discussing comments received from stakeholders that the scope of the
estoppel provision was unclear and “is the most frequently identified inequity that deters third
parties from filing requests for inter partes reexamination of patents” and further noting that “the
lack of such procedural mechanisms as discovery and cross-examination that would be available
in litigation has apparently resulted in challengers being unwilling to invoke inter partes
reexamination and risk its estoppel effect”).
191. Id. at 8–9; accord U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN
(submitted to Congress in Feb. 2002); Patent Quality Improvement: Post-Grant Opposition:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 5 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 House Hearing] (statement of James A.
Toupin, General Counsel, USPTO).
192. Patent Quality Improvement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet &
Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 7, 9 (2003) [hereinafter 2003
House Hearing].
193. Id. at 9 (statement of AIPLA) (“We see no justification for a third party, who is aware
of information, or who reasonably could have become aware of such information, not to base a
reexamination request on all such information. This balance was struck to ensure that patentees
of limited means would not be subject to harassment from serial challenges of a third party
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stakeholders raised increasing alarm over what they perceived as a rise in
the USPTO issuing patents that it should not have issued, and suggested
more exhaustive adversarial post-grant proceedings as an efficient means
to challenge these patents after issuance.194 In 2004, the House
Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing to consider creation of more
complete post-grant proceedings.195 At this hearing, stakeholders
presented a variety of views on the appropriate scope of estoppel; some
stakeholders argued that estoppel should apply to grounds raised during
the proceeding and some argued for no statutory estoppel at all.196
Over the course of the next six years, new patent reform bills that
would have created new, more complete post-grant proceedings were
presented almost every year.197 The estoppel provisions in those bills
included language limiting estoppel to “any issue of fact or law actually
decided by the panel and necessary to the determination of that issue”198
or to grounds “raised” during the review.199 At hearings on the bills, many
stakeholders, especially practicing entities, testified in favor of a narrow
scope of estoppel.200 Several others, however, such as the USPTO and
requestor based on information that the requestor could have submitted initially, and we believe
it is a correct balance.”).
194. A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 3 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004),
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/10976/a-patent-system-for-the-21st-century [https://perma.cc/
S2YW-LJDC] (“There are . . . several reasons to suspect that more issued patents are substandard,
particularly in technologies newly subject to patenting.”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 5 (2003),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balancecompetition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf (discussing stakeholder concerns that
numerous patents that are likely invalid as obvious block commercialization of new innovations
in certain technology areas such as software and biotech).
195. 2004 House Hearing, supra note 191, at 2.
196. E.g., id. at 14 (statement of Jeffrey Kushan on behalf of Genentech, Inc.) (“[W]e believe
Congress should not attempt to create any special statutory estoppel provisions in any new
system.”); id. at 38 (statement of Karl Sun, Head of Patents, Google, Inc.) (“[E]stoppel arising
from patent opposition should be limited to the grounds that are raised and addressed in the
opposition.”).
197. E.g., H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 3600, 110th Cong.
(2008); S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 338(a) (2d Sess. 2008) (reported Jan. 24, 2008); H.R. 1908, 110th
Cong. (2d Sess. 2007) (introduced Apr. 18, 2007); H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 1 (2005).
198. H.R. 2795 § 1.
199. H.R. 1260 §§ 334–335; S. 515; S. 1145 § 338(a); S. 3600, 110th Cong. § 322(d) (2008);
H.R. 1908 § 334(a).
200. Perspectives on Patents: Post- Grant Review Procedures and other Litigation Reforms:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
5 (2006) (statement of Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Cisco
Systems, Inc.); id. at 6 (statement of Phillip S. Johnson, Chief Patent Counsel, Johnson &
Johnson); id. at 21 (statement of John R. Thomas, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center) (“I think the issue before you is whether we ought to encourage prompt patent challenges
through the Draconian sanction of disallowing individuals from bringing them at all.”).
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universities, testified in favor of a broader scope of estoppel that would
enable these proceedings to function as “a complete alternative to
litigation.”201
C. The AIA’s Estoppel Provisions
Committee reports on what became the AIA reflect a desire to
transform the prior inter partes reexamination “from an examinational to
an adjudicative proceeding” through the creation of IPR.202 In the course
of adapting the statutory text for inter partes reexamination, Congress
carried over much of the language of the estoppel provision applicable to
inter partes reexamination to the estoppel provision applicable to IPR
proceedings.203 Specifically, the petitioner in an IPR of a patent claim
addressed in a final written decision would be barred from later raising
any ground for invalidity “that the petitioner raised or”—with the new
addition of the word “reasonably”—“reasonably could have raised during
that inter partes review.”204 Legislators found that they could not carry
over the estoppel provision from inter partes reexamination to inter
partes review without keeping the phrase “could have raised,” given the
objection of some patent owners to removing the now-entrenched
language.205
201. Patent Reform: The Future of American Innovation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 13 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 Senate Hearing] (statement of Jon Dudas,
Director, USPTO) (“[T]he estoppel needs to be quite strong that says on the second window any
issue that you raised or could have raised . . . you can bring up no place else. That second window,
from the administration’s position, is intended to allow nothing—a complete alternative to
litigation.”); accord id. (statement of William T. Tucker, Executive Director, Research and
Administration and Technology Transfer, University of California-Oakland).
202. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 46 (2011).
203. Compare American Inventors Protection Act of 1990 (AIPA), Pub. L. No. 106-113, sec.
4604, § 315(c), 113 Stat. 1501A-552, 1501A-569 with 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012).
204. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(e); AIPA sec. 4604, § 315(c). What meaning should courts derive
from the addition of the word “reasonably” in the phrase “raised or reasonably could have raised”?
Despite the principle against use of legislative history to derive meaning, courts often consider
statutory history, finding that if the legislature amends a statute, a significant change in language
when compared to the prior version of the statute can indicate a change in meaning. SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 45, at 256–60. Yet courts must determine whether the different words used
truly have a different meaning and if that different meaning is relevant to the ambiguity being
resolved. Here, though there is a difference between “reasonably could have raised” and “could
have raised,” any difference has no impact on whether estoppel should arise from events occurring
prior to institution because both phrases are modified by “during that . . . review.” Id.
205. See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of
II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 616 (2011) (citing 2007 Senate Hearing, supra note 201, at 210
(statement of Bruce Bernstein, Chief Intellectual Property and Licensing Officer, InterDigital
Communications Corp.); see also Patent Act of 2005: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
the Internet & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 26 (2005)
(statement of Carl Gulbrandsen, Managing Director, Wisconsin Alumni Research Found.); 2003
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In debates, some legislators argued that the scope of estoppel
following IPRs should apply broadly. Senator Kyl stated that an IPR “will
completely substitute for at least the patents-and-printed-publications
portion of the civil litigation.”206 Senator Kyl also proposed that the
phrase “reasonably could have raised” means that estoppel extends to
“prior art which a skilled researcher conducting a diligent search
reasonably could have been expected to discover” in time to include in
the petition for review.207 However, the committee report’s description of
the estoppel provision essentially parroted the statutory text, providing
no further guidance as to Congress’s intended meaning.208
In contrast, the legislative history with respect to the PGR provisions
makes clear that Congress intended estoppel following PGR to apply
narrowly, only to grounds that were “actually raised,” as the final
committee report repeatedly states.209 Stakeholders viewed PGR, with its
short nine-month window for filing a petition, as a more limited
proceeding that should have a more narrow estoppel than IPRs. 210 But if
House Hearing, supra note 192, at 9 (statement of Charles Van Horn, Partner, Finnegan,
Henderson, Farrabow, Garret & Dunner, on behalf of AIPLA); 157 CONG. REC. S1326 (daily ed.
Mar. 7, 2011) (statement of Sen. Sessions) (“The bill also includes many protections that were
long sought by inventors and patent owners. It preserves estoppel against relitigating in court
those issues that an inter partes challenger reasonably could have raised in his administrative
challenge.”); 157 CONG. REC. S1367 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kohl) (“Patent
protection will be stronger with the inclusion of 'could have raised' estoppel [and] strong
administrative estoppel[.]”).
206. 157 CONG. REC. S1376 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
207. Id. at S1375.
208. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 47 (2011).
209. Id. at 76 (“Post-grant petitioners are only estopped from raising in civil litigation or ITC
proceedings those issues that they actually raised in the post-grant review.”); accord id. at 48
(“Further, a final decision in a post-grant review process will prevent the petitioner, a real party
in interest, or its privy from challenging any patent claim on a ground that was raised in the postgrant review process.”); see also id. at 46, 48 (citing U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra
note 191(explaining that the primary reason why stakeholders declined to use the reexamination
proceedings is that the risk of expansive estoppel was too great in light of the limited nature of
the proceedings)) (acknowledging the USPTO’s concerns raised in its 2004 report that inter partes
reexamination went largely unused and then expressing that the approach for PGR was “intended
to remove current disincentives to current administrative processes”).
210. Matal, supra note 205, at 617; see also Patent Reform Act of 2007: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 98 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 House Hearing] (statement of Anthony Peterman, Director,
Patent Counsel, Dell Inc.) (“We believe that parties should be precluded from [raising] in
subsequent proceedings only . . . those issues that were addressed and considered in the post grant
process.”); 2004 House Hearing, supra note 191, at 32 (statement of Michael Kirk, Executive
Director, AIPLA) (testifying with regard to PGRs) (“If the estoppel provision is too harsh, no one
will use the procedure . . . . Given the relatively short, nine-month period for initiating an
opposition and the limited discovery available to the parties, we believe this would strike the right
balance.”); 2004 House Hearing, supra note 191, at 17 (statement of Jeffrey Kushan, Sidley
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Congress intended the estoppel arising from PGRs to be so different from
that following IPRs, why does the PGR statutory estoppel provision use
nearly identical language to that of IPRs, referring to grounds the
petitioner “raised or reasonably could have raised”?
Both the bill passed by the Senate and the bill first introduced in the
House did not contain the phrase “or reasonably could have raised” in the
estoppel provision applicable to federal court or ITC proceedings
following PGR.211 Yet the bill as reported by the House Judiciary
Committee used the phrase “or reasonably could have raised” in all of the
estoppel provisions applicable to both IPR and PGR.212 Joe Matal, a
senior staffer involved in drafting the provisions, explained, “the change
appears to have been made in error by staff charged with making
technical corrections to the bill when it was reported by the House
Judiciary Committee.”213 Statements made by both legislators and
stakeholders during later proposed technical amendments likewise
acknowledge this change was an erroneous technical correction.214 Even
the AIA’s namesake Senator Leahy stated after enactment that the “could
have raised” language in the PGR provision was an “inadvertent
scrivener’s error” that “unintentionally creates a higher threshold of
estoppel than was [intended by Congress].”215 The “correction” went
Austin Brown & Wood, on behalf of Genentech, Inc.) (“Congress should avoid including estoppel
provisions in any post grant review legislation, and should specifically avoid including provisions
that are comparable to the codified and uncodified estoppel provisions applicable to inter partes
reexamination proceedings.”); Perspectives of Patents: Post-Grant Review Procedures and Other
Litigation Reforms: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 45–46 (2003) (statement of Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President and
General Counsel, Cisco Systems) (recommending “a second window” for post-grant review in
which the defendant “will be estopped from re-litigating in the court action any issues actually
raised and decided in the administrative proceeding and subsequent action for judicial review”).
But see 2007 House Hearing, supra, at 40 (2007) (statement of Kevin Sharer, CEO and Chairman
of the Board, Amgen, Inc.) (“[C]hallengers who pursue [a postgrant] opposition should be
prohibited from later disputing the patent’s validity in court.”).
211. S. 23, 112th Cong. sec. 5(d), § 325(e)(2) (2011); H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. sec. 5(d),
§ 325(e)(2) (2011) (as introduced).
212. H.R. 1249, sec. 6(d), § 325(e)(2).
213. Matal, supra note 205, at 618.
214. Implementation of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on the judiciary, 112th Cong. 24 (2012) (testimony of Robert A. Armitage, Senior Vice President
and General Counsel of Eli Lilly and Company), http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/
Hearings%202012/Armitage%2005162012.pdf (stating “a technical error during the legislative
process . . . inadvertently raised the estoppel” and that the narrower estoppel was “specifically
supported . . . by the major proponents of comprehensive patent reform.”); 158 CONG. REC.
E2017 (daily ed. Dec. 31, 2012) (statement of Rep. Smith) (“The change appears to have been
made by staff charged with making technical corrections to the bill, who apparently assumed that
the omission of could-have-raised estoppel in § 325(e)(2) was an oversight.”).
215. 158 CONG. REC. S8517 (daily ed. Dec. 28, 2012) (statement of Sen. Leahy).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss6/1

46

Laser: The Scope of IPR Estoppel: A Statutory, Historical, and Normative

2018]

THE SCOPE OF IPR ESTOPPEL

1173

unnoticed through enactment, with the 2011 Committee Report
accompanying the reported bill continuing to discuss the bill as though
the estoppel that applied in federal courts and the ITC following PGR
only applied narrowly to issues actually raised: “Post-grant petitioners
are only estopped from raising in civil litigation or ITC proceedings those
issues that they actually raised in the post-grant review.”216 Technical
amendments later proposed to correct this error were rejected as
procedurally improper substantive changes,217 and there was little
political will at the time to call for substantive changes to the AIA so soon
after passage.218 Therefore, although some might argue based on the
legislative history that a broader scope of estoppel should apply with
respect to IPRs, the legislative history of PGRs indicates that Congress
intended estoppel to apply only narrowly.
V. POLICY ANALYSIS
Policy justifications, like legislative history, should not affect an
analysis of the scope of the AIA’s estoppel provisions given the
unambiguous language of the text.219 Nonetheless, policy justifications
would support a narrow reading of the AIA’s estoppel provisions.
A. Addressing the Patent Quality Problem Requires Narrow Estoppel
A narrow estoppel that does not extend to issues that were never
litigated plays a key role in supporting the AIA’s patent quality goals.
Among the AIA’s goals were “improving patent quality,” “providing a
more efficient system for challenging patents that should not have
issued,” and “reducing unwarranted litigation costs and inconsistent
damage awards.”220 In particular, a key ambition of the new post-grant
proceedings was to reduce the threat of what legislators considered to be
216. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 76 (2011); Matal, supra note 205, at 618
(“Unfortunately, no one caught the error during the three and a half months between the time
when the bill was reported by the committee and when it was signed by the President.”).
217. Oversight of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Implementation of the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act and International Harmonization Efforts Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 17 (2012) (statement of Sen. Coburn) (“[T]hings greater than technical
corrections deserve a full and comprehensive hearing where all stakeholders have an opportunity
to have input. . . . [A]nything that significantly changes the estoppel provisions in the bill we
passed needs to have the full consideration of all the stakeholders and all the members of this
Committee . . . .”).
218. See Abusive Patent Litigation: The Impact on American Innovation and Jobs, and
Potential Solutions, Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop. & the Internet, H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 15 (statement of Phillip S. Johnson, Chief Intellectual Property
Counsel, Johnson & Johnson).
219. Supra Part II.A.
220. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1 at 39–40.
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poor quality221 patents by making it easier to invalidate such patents after
issuance.222 For years leading up to passage of the AIA in 2011, patent
stakeholders and scholars had raised increasing alarm over what they
perceived as an overgrowth of poor quality patents.223 According to these
calls, a thicket of cumulative patents that did not appear to meet the
conditions for patent eligibility emerged in many technology areas,
dramatically increasing the cost of doing business or blocking
commercialization of products developed as those patents spent years or
decades working their way to the front of the USPTO’s lengthy patent
backlog.224 In the area of software patents, for example, many argued that
the USPTO failed for over a decade to hire examiners skilled in this
technology area and failed to properly classify software art for searching,
resulting in incomplete examination of such patents.225
Additionally, by the time the AIA was passed in 2011, the Patent
Office was facing a budget crisis; Congress had diverted nearly a billion
dollars of user fees from the Patent Office to non-patent programs,
221. The term “poor quality” in this Article refers to patents that, on a closer examination,
would not be found to meet the standards of patent eligibility set out in the Patent Act, such as if
they are obvious, not novel, or indefinite.
222. 157 CONG. REC. 9778 (2011) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (“[A]fter the PTO issues a
patent, this legislation creates a new post-grant opposition system in which third parties can raise
objections to a patent immediately after its issuance, which will both help screen out bad patents
while bolstering valid ones.”); H.R. REP. NO. 112-98 pt. 1, 39–40 (noting that post-grant
proceedings will provide an “efficient system for challenging patents that should not have
issued”).
223. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. 9784 (letter of National Association of Realtors)
(“Modernization is critically needed to improve the quality of issued patents . . . .”); A PATENT
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 194; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 194 (discussing
stakeholder concerns that numerous patents that are likely invalid as obvious block
commercialization of new innovations in certain technology areas such as software and biotech).
See generally Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999)
(discussing business method patents).
224. 157 CONG. REC. 9784 (statement of Rep. Lofgren) (“The Patent Office has a tremendous
backlog, and that is a serious concern for inventors and really for the country. The examiners have
such an enormous backlog, they can't spend sufficient time reviewing the applicants. This has led
to a flood of poor-quality patents that were issued over the last decade and a half that I think—
and most believe—should have been denied by the office. These dubious patents do significant
damage to particular industries, like the information technology industry, as they can be used by
nonpracticing entities to demand rents from legitimate businesses and to interfere with the
development of legitimate products.”); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross
Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 120–21 (2000).
225. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1495 n.2 (2001). Lemley argued that the Patent Office’s incomplete examination of patents is
generally rational but noted, “[T]he PTO clearly missed the ball for over a decade [with regard to
software patents], failing to hire examiners skilled in the software arts or to allow software
engineers to practice before it, and failing to classify software prior art well.” Id.
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robbing the Patent Office of funding that might otherwise have been used
to hire and train examiners.226 USPTO examiners spend an average of
about nineteen hours total reviewing each patent application (with
variation based on the complexity of the technology).227 A 2010 report
commissioned by the Patent Office noted that examiners frequently
expressed that the amount of time available for them to review each
patent was “not enough time to do a proper job.”228 Recent research has
demonstrated that such time constraints bias the Patent Office’s granting
practices, increasing the likelihood that it will issue any given patent
application.229
The AIA also sought to address the problem of patents issued under
standards for validity that no longer applied.230 In the decade leading up
to passage of the AIA, several key Supreme Court patent cases changed
what patent stakeholders and examiners believed to be the law.231 These
changes placed the validity of many previously-issued patents into
question.232 Legislators hoped that the AIA’s new post-grant
proceedings, especially the transitional CBMR proceedings, would
provide a less expensive means of challenging patents that were likely
invalid after recent Supreme Court cases such as Bilski v. Kappos.233

226. 157 CONG. REC. 9783–84 (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (“We also need to pass this
legislation to make sure that the fee diversion, that, as has been noted, has kept nearly $1 billion
from going to the operation of the Patent Office to work down the 3-year 1 million patent backlog,
also can be addressed.”).
227. Lemley, supra note 225, at 1500 n.19 (citing Interview with Q. Todd Dickinson,
Director, USPTO, in Berkeley, Cal. (Apr. 2000)) (noting that examiners spent an average of
eighteen hours reviewing each patent, ranging from eight hours to thirty-two hours depending on
technological complexity); see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, EXAMINATION TIME AND
THE PRODUCTION SYSTEM 16 (2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/Examination
%20Time%20and%20the%20Production%20System.pdf (noting goals of 16.6 hours per
application on basic technologies and 27.7 hours on certain advanced technologies); Michael D.
Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, The Failed Promise of User Fees: Empirical Evidence from the
United States Patent and Trademark Office, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 602, 602–36 (2014)
(calculating average of 19 hours).
228. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level
Application Data, 99(3) REV. ECON. & STATS. 550, 550 n.2 (2017) (quoting internal report on file
with authors, obtained pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request).
229. Id. at 561.
230. See 157 CONG. REC. 9791 (statement of Rep. Smith) (“It is likely that most if not all the
business method patents that were issued after State Street are now invalid under Bilski. There is
no sense in allowing expensive litigation over patents that are no longer valid.”).
231. Id.; e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612–13 (2010); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 427–28 (2007).
232. See 157 CONG. REC. 9791.
233. 561 U.S. 593 (2011); 157 CONG. REC. 9791.
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Of course, reasonably complete and prompt initial examination has an
important role to play in a functioning patent ecosystem. 234 If the Patent
Office were to continuously issue patents that would have been found
invalid if examiners were more knowledgeable about the technology at
issue or spent only slightly more time spent on review, businesses would
begin to doubt that issued patents are likely to be upheld when tested. In
fields where businesses lose trust in the validity of issued patents, they
may choose to operate in ignorance of them, finding that designing their
products around sometimes thousands of patents is not justified when the
PTAB or courts will likely find them invalid upon closer review. The
speed of initial examination is even more important. When patents spend
years working their way through the Patent Office, only to emerge after
competitors spent millions on manufacturing and branding, the patent
holder can extract significantly more value from licensing than may have
been possible before the competitor invested as much into the product.235
Yet patent quality is not a problem that can be efficiently solved
merely by improving initial examination.236 Post-grant challenges to
issued patents are a critical second half.237 Low-cost, yet thorough
adversarial post-grant proceedings that occur shortly after issuance are a
relatively efficient means of ensuring that the issued patents that are most
likely to be asserted are valid—these proceedings only result in the
expense of testing those patents where the scope and validity are valuable
to patentees and competitors to determine.238 Moreover, unlike the Patent
Office, an adversarial party often has an incentive to invest the resources
necessary to locate prior art or otherwise fully litigate the challenge to the
patent, as well as incentive to not expend more resources than are justified
given the value of that patent or the value of clearing that portion of a
patent thicket.239 A key goal of the AIA’s new post-grant review
processes was to take advantage of the adversarial process to provide
patents the more thorough review they might not have received during
234. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135,
2139–40 (2009) (“[T]he case for better patent quality still carries the day . . . . [A] patent system
characterized by low patent quality sows substantial uncertainty at all levels of the patent
system . . . . Uncertainty obviously makes business decisions based on patents (whether by
patentees, prospective licensees, investors, etc.) much more difficult and costly.”).
235. Shapiro, supra note 224, at 120–21.
236. See generally F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and
Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55 (2003) (advocating for a
registration-only or “soft-look” initial patent examination); Lemley, supra note 225, at 1496
(arguing that increasing funds for initial examination might not be the best use of resources, when
only a limited number of patents ultimately have value to patentees and competitors).
237. See Lemley, supra note 225, at 1520.
238. See id. at 1509–11.
239. See id.
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original examination, thereby invalidating those patents “that should not
have issued,” at a faster speed and lower cost than that typically seen in
litigation.240 Some have raised concern since passage of the AIA that the
PTAB became a patent “death squad,” as it has invalidated at least some
patent claims in more than 80% of IPRs that resulted in a final written
decision.241 However, this figure is potentially misleading242 and
invalidation of patents that were issued in the decades leading up to the
passage of the AIA but do not meet current standards of patentability was
a founding principle of the AIA. All patent stakeholders should recognize
post-grant proceedings as the necessary second half of an efficient system
of screening patentability, rather than vilifying these proceedings as a
killer of valid rights.
Of course, relying only on adversarial proceedings to police patent
validity after issuance places much of the cost of testing validity on the
challenger while providing positive externalities to other competitors and
the public. Consequently, in some circumstances, the challenger will not
have adequate incentive to challenge a patent that would otherwise be
found invalid. As noted, there is value to the marketplace of having
enough certainty in the validity of patents at the time of issuance that it
will be rational for businesses to continue to consider new patents as they
design and invest in innovations. Therefore, a balanced approach that
relies on both a quality initial examination and an efficient and thorough
post-grant review process is critical to ensuring that the patents in force
are valid, high-quality patents.
In particular, PGR, which takes place immediately after patent
issuance, stands to provide the greatest market benefit as an adversarial
proceeding capable of resolving patentees’ or competitors’ questions of
patent validity early in a patent’s term. The earlier in a patent’s term that
validity issues can be resolved, the less waste that will result in the
marketplace. First, it reduces the frequency of market participants
incurring unnecessary licensing fees and decreases competitors’ costs to
design around or even abandon potentially infringing products.
240. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39–40 (2011) (noting one goal of the AIA was “providing
a more efficient system for challenging patents that should not have issued”); 157 CONG. REC.
9773 (2011) (statement of Rep. Smith) (“The America Invents Act reduces frivolous litigation
over weak or overbroad patents by establishing a pilot program to review a limited group of
business method patents that never should have been awarded in the first place.”); 157 CONG.
REC. 9784 (statement of Rep. Lofgren) (“This has led to a flood of poor-quality patents that were
issued over the last decade and a half that I think—and most believe—should have been denied
by the office.”).
241. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 7, at 10.
242. BRIAN C. HOWARD, LEX MACHINA: PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD (PTAB) 2017
REPORT 1 (2017), http://pages.lexmachina.com/Email_PTABReport2017_LPRequests.html
(stating that the “death squad” label is undeserved and finding that looking at instituted petitions,
rather than just those resulting in a final decision, all claims were invalidated 38% of the time).
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Additionally, earlier clarification of patentability reduces the patentee’s
risks in bringing a new product to market, the costs of which the patentee
might not recoup if the patent is invalidated and it loses its exclusive
rights.
Nonetheless, under these same principles, where issues of patent
validity are not addressed in a post-grant proceeding, either because the
PTAB denies institution or because the petitioner could not include
legitimate grounds for invalidity within the word limits of the petition or
did not locate the art in time, the patent quality goals of the AIA are
served by leaving open the possibility of litigation or other adversarial
proceedings as a means of resolving the remaining questions of patent
validity. We can only assure that the patents affecting competition and
investment in the U.S. are valid if every legitimate ground for patent
invalidity may be resolved in at least one tribunal after issuance.
B. Broad Estoppel is Incompatible with the PTAB’s Incomplete Review
PTAB proceedings are not currently an equivalent alternative to
litigation. Estoppel should not apply as though they are. As noted, after
passage of the AIA, the PTAB adopted strict procedural limitations on
PTAB petitions.243 The word count requirement, which applies inclusive
of claim charts, does not provide enough space for a petitioner in a
complex technology area to raise all, or even most, legitimate grounds for
patent invalidity it may have.244 Congress likely did not anticipate that
the PTAB’s implementing procedures would so severely limit the number
of grounds for invalidity that a petitioner could include in the petition for
review. To the contrary, the legislative history of the AIA indicates that
Congress envisioned broad post-grant proceedings that would provide
meaningful, thorough adjudication of grounds for invalidity—a true
“alternative to litigation.”245
If estoppel following post-grant proceedings were broad enough to
preclude grounds that were not litigated in the PTAB proceeding, it would
function more like the common law merger doctrine of claim preclusion
than the doctrine of estoppel that is its namesake.246 However, the fairness
243. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.24 (2017) (listing procedural requirements).
244. See id.; Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 n.22 (1982) (“While our
previous expressions of the requirement of a full and fair opportunity to litigate have been in the
context of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, it is clear from what follows that invocation of
res judicata or claim preclusion is subject to the same limitation.”).
245. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S5429 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Senator Kyl)
(“[I]n light of the present bill’s enhanced estoppels, it is important that the section 315(b) deadline
afford defendants a reasonable opportunity to identify and understand the patent claims that are
relevant to the litigation.”).
246. See supra Part II.F.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss6/1

52

Laser: The Scope of IPR Estoppel: A Statutory, Historical, and Normative

2018]

THE SCOPE OF IPR ESTOPPEL

1179

of the merger doctrine relies upon a key element not applicable in current
PTAB practice: that the plaintiff has the full opportunity to raise all the
grounds that will be considered merged into a judgment. 247 Instead, in
post-grant proceedings before the PTAB, the PTAB’s procedural limits
on petitions effectively limit the grounds for invalidity that a petitioner
can include in its petition.248 Because these practices render post-grant
proceedings an incomplete review, it would be neither fair to the
petitioner nor consistent with historical practices in the common law to
apply a broad estoppel that precludes all grounds for invalidity that could
have been raised in the petition for review. Future amendments to PTAB
procedures, such as expanding or eliminating the word or page limits for
IPRs, could bring IPRs closer to being the “alternative to litigation” of
the patents and printed publications portion of validity that Congress
intended. Although the Supreme Court’s current, textualist analysis
would not support broad estoppel even with such amendments, a
modification of IPR procedures that provides petitioners a full and fair
opportunity to raise all grounds for invalidity based on patents and printed
publications would limit the policy-based justifications for narrow
estoppel.
C. Narrow Estoppel Will Increase Use of PGR, as Congress Intended
A narrower reading of PGR estoppel provisions will increase the use
of PGR proceedings. Currently, with only 51 petitions having been filed
between 2012–2017 (just 1% of all AIA petitions to date249), PGR is the
least used of the AIA’s new post-grant proceedings. Because of the broad
scope of grounds for invalidity that may be raised in a PGR, litigants may
be concerned that if they choose to bring a PGR, a broad reading of the
AIA’s estoppel provisions might bar them from raising essentially any
invalidity defense in future litigation.250 This risk could prompt—and,
based on the low usage of PGR, appears to be prompting—many litigants
to either not file a petition for post-grant proceedings at all (instead
raising the defense only in litigation) or to wait to file a petition for postgrant proceedings for nine months after issuance, when IPR becomes
247. See supra Part II.F.
248. See supra Part II.F. Additionally, prior to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in SAS
Institute that prohibited “partial institution,” PTAB decisions were also an incomplete review in
the sense that they failed to resolve all the claims raised in the petition, unlike adjudication in
court that resolves all the claims raised in the complaint (and not settled or dismissed).
249. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 7 (noting that IPRs constituted 92% of
the 6700 total AIA petitions filed to date, CBMRs constituted 7%, and PGRs constituted 1%).
250. Cf. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 191, at 5 (noting the low rate of
usage of inter partes reexamination was primarily due to concerns over a possible broad scope of
estoppel).
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available (with its narrower scope and thus narrower potential estoppel
under a broad reading of the provisions). PGR was created with an
important purpose for controlling patent quality and with the intent that
it be used.251 A broad reading of the PGR estoppel provision frustrates
the purpose of these proceedings. Indeed, as discussed in the legislative
history section, legislators intended estoppel to apply narrowly following
PGRs to only those grounds actually raised and addressed in the
review.252 When courts make clear that these estoppel provisions are to
be interpreted narrowly, or if Congress amends the PGR estoppel
provision to correct the drafting error that caused the present language,
parties will make use of PGR proceedings as intended.
D. Impact on Later Proceedings
Although a narrow scope of estoppel could result in more litigation on
the merits of invalidity than a broad reading, this is a necessary cost to
assure estoppel is applied according to the terms of the statute or—under
a policy approach—in a way that comports with due process and supports
the AIA’s competing patent quality goals, as discussed above.
Ultimately, the question of the appropriate scope of estoppel from a
policy perspective will, in many cases, come to a choice between
efficiency and completeness. Because a proliferation of issued patents
that do not meet the conditions of patentability have the potential to cause
public harm, the ability to raise all grounds for invalidity in some forum,
rather than foreclosing legitimate grounds for invalidity from
consideration entirely, may outweigh the efficiency concerns of litigating
unresolved invalidity questions in district courts.
Moreover, a narrow scope of estoppel provides more certainty to
parties as to what grounds will be subject to estoppel, which can curb
some of the increased litigation expense. Uncertainty as to the scope of a
litigation increases its cost without benefit to the court or the parties. A
narrow reading of the estoppel provision provides a clear and certain
scope to estoppel: Estoppel applies only as to those grounds included in
the petition, provided the PTAB grants institution. The scope of this
estoppel is especially clear following the Supreme Court’s ruling in SAS
Industries, which requires the PTAB, if it institutes review, to consider
all claims and grounds for invalidity that were included in the petition.253
In contrast, a broad reading makes the scope of estoppel subject to
expensive discovery and motion practice as to what grounds and art the
251. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 46, 48 (2011) (acknowledging the USPTO’s concerns
raised in its 2004 report that inter partes reexamination went largely unused and then expressing
that the approach for PGR was “intended to remove current disincentives to current administrative
processes”).
252. Supra Part IV.C.
253. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354–60 (2018).
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patent owner should have discovered prior to the PTAB proceeding—
drastically reducing the cost-saving benefits of avoiding a merits inquiry.
Some might raise the concern that a narrow reading of the estoppel
provision would enable the petitioner to strategically file multiple
successive inter partes review petitions on different art without regard to
whether the petitioner reasonably should have included that art or
grounds in the original petition. However, estoppel is not the only, or
even the primary, mechanism available in the AIA’s statutory framework
to address successive petitioning. For example, the AIA permits the
PTAB to deny a petition if it presents “the same or substantially the same
prior art or arguments” as previously before the Office.254 Moreover, the
Supreme Court’s decision in SAS Industries indicates that the PTAB has
broad discretion to deny petitions, perhaps even without this
justification.255 Nonetheless, enabling the petitioner to file multiple
petitions if the art and arguments are substantially different in each
petition would increase revenue for the Patent Office and ensure each
argument has sufficient space to be adequately presented. This could
potentially result in a patent facing years of repeated reviews, but only if
each of the grounds raised in later petitions has sufficient merit to justify
institution and is sufficiently different than prior grounds to not be denied
for improper successive petitioning or for another reason under PTAB’s
discretion. Addressing legitimate grounds for invalidity on the merits in
at least one forum after issuance helps to assure that the patents that have
the greatest impact on investment and competition meet current standards
of patentability.
CONCLUSION
Applying the Supreme Court’s modern, textualist approach to
statutory interpretation yields only one appropriate interpretation of the
AIA’s estoppel provision: “[D]uring that . . . review” refers to the time
period after institution of the IPR and before a final decision from the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), limiting estoppel only to grounds
on which the PTAB institutes review, even if they were not raised in the
petition for review. Although the Federal Circuit has generally favored a
textualist reading of this statute, it has yet to address how the estoppel
standard would apply as to grounds that the petitioner chose not to include
254. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) (2012) (“In determining whether to institute or order a proceeding
under this chapter [PGR and CBMR], chapter 30 [reexamination], or chapter 31 [IPR], the
Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or
substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.”). This
authority is separate from, and in addition to, the estoppel effect of prior decisions. See id.
§§ 315(e), 325(e).
255. 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1351 (2018) (“§ 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on the
question whether to institute review . . . .”) (emphasis in original).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

55

Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 6 [2019], Art. 1

1182

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

in the petition for IPR. When the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court
next has occasion to consider this issue, applying the sound principles of
statutory interpretation explained and analyzed in this Article will yield a
narrow estoppel.
Although legislative history indicates that, at least for IPRs, those
outspoken members of Congress who addressed this issue intended a
broad estoppel that would make PTAB proceedings an alternative to
litigation of the patents-and-printed publications portion of invalidity,
this legislative history cannot, under the Supreme Court’s current
approach, usurp the text of the statute. Indeed, the constitutional
principles of bicameralism and presentment require Congress to express
its intent through the text, not through statements made on the floor of
Congress or in committee reports but left out of the text. Therefore, if a
broader scope of estoppel is justified by legislative history, policy, or
other concerns, it is the duty of Congress to amend its text rather than of
the duty of the courts to interpret statutory estoppel more broadly than the
text permits.
Here, however, a narrow scope of estoppel comports with the stated
policy goals of the AIA. In light of the strict limits on IPR petitions
adopted by the PTAB, which Congress did not foresee, and which
effectively limit the grounds for invalidity a petitioner may raise during
the IPR, IPR currently does not function as a true alternative to litigation.
Moreover, broadening estoppel to effectively remove certain patents
from thorough judicial review undermines the AIA’s goal of reevaluating
the most competitively important patents to ensure that they are
patentable, particularly after several Supreme Court decisions that
changed what many believed to be the law. Initial examination, while
critically important to a functioning patent system, cannot efficiently
function as the only screen for patentability. If estoppel is applied broadly
to grounds for invalidity that were never litigated, some patents will
remain in force that do not meet current standards for patentability.
Narrow estoppel helps to ensure that the patents in force—those where
patentees are collecting licensing fees, and forcing competitors to design
around, and winning infringement lawsuits—are valid. Although these
policy arguments do not carry weight under the Supreme Court’s current
approach to statutory interpretation, they should help to ameliorate
concerns of the consequences of a narrow statutory interpretation of
estoppel.
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